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Abstract
This thesis focuses on two related areas of the political economy of reform in
Europe. First, I present preliminary evidence for the EMU, for the period pre-
ceding the Great Recession, showing that countries that experienced a higher
windfall of credit implemented a lower number of reforms and experienced a
higher increase in corruption. Second, I present a literature review on the politi-
cal economy of reform of dual labour market systems in Europe, and an analysis
of labour market reform activity in EMU countries in times of economic boom
and crisis. I discuss the reasons for the puzzling persistence of duality, and
provide a summary of the main drivers of duality-reducing reforms.
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Introduction
Understanding the drivers of policy reform and the persistence of bad institu-
tions has proven to be a very elusive matter in the social sciences. Throughout
the Great Recession in Europe, academics have learned of the importance of
domestic power relations and European political economy dynamics to under-
stand the success or failure of policy reform. Similarly, European policy-makers
are in permanent need of better toolkits for the adequate implementation of
reforms. My goal in this work is to contribute to a better understanding of the
political economy of reform in Europe, with a particular focus on the interaction
between credit booms and institutions, and the political economy of reform of
labour markets.
The point of departure of this research project was the identiﬁcation of some
unresolved puzzles regarding the complex relationship between the development
of the European Monetary Union (EMU) and the reform dynamics of its mem-
ber states. Initially, the EMU was conceived, partly, as a mechanism that would
help reduce the institutional and competitiveness gaps among European coun-
tries (see, for instance, Eichengreen and Frieden (1993)). By abandoning the
possibility of currency devaluation, the theory said, the economies with weaker
institutions would have no choice but to implement structural reform and mod-
ernize their economies. This would naturally lead to a convergence towards best
practices in all policy areas, from labour markets, to pension systems and taxes.
Notably, the monetary straightjacket imposed by the irrevocable ﬁxed ex-
change rate regime was expected to be more favourable for Southern European
economies. Most of these economies were barely escaping from semi-autarkic
dictatorships, where clientelism and rent-seeking were common practice. For
decades, these countries had suﬀered from ﬁscal imbalances, persistent ﬁnan-
cial instability, large unemployment levels and uncontrolled inﬂation. The EMU
would provide the indispensible anchor for these countries to abandon once and
for all these bad practices and policies.
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When the project to unite all the currencies into the Euro became a re-
ality, the rhythm of reforms accelerated. Nobody wanted to be left behind
and countries, particularly in the South, started, albeit at diﬀerent rhythms,
adapting their economies to European standards. The ﬁnancial crises in the
seventies and eighties and, since the 90s the EMU convergence criteria, led to
deep transformations in these economies: liberalization of large economic sec-
tors, improvements in the welfare state and tax systems, a reduction in tariﬀs
and barriers to trade, and reforms in most areas. The Maastricht Treaty, signed
in 1991, established ambitious deﬁcit, debt and inﬂation objectives and the need
to stabilize nominal exchange rates within the Exchange Rate Mechanism left
little space for countries to avoid reforms.
In 1999 countries became ﬁnally full members of the EMU, abandoning their
monetary policy autonomy. One immediate eﬀect of the Euro was that the
perception of risk by investors immediately dropped and real-interest rates fell
sharply in peripheral countries. By 2001, Greece was able to borrow at German-
level interest rates. The large ﬂow of credit that went into these economies
generated large internal and external imbalances. In some cases credit went to
ﬁnance quickly rising public debt levels (like in Greece) and in other cases pri-
vate debt and real estate booms (like in Spain). In all cases, including Ireland,
external indebtedness increased abruptly.
A second eﬀect of ﬁnally entering the Euro was that the rhythm of reforms
slowed-down. Unlike what the theory had predicted, the peripheral economies,
fuelled by credit-driven economic growth, had fewer incentives to implement
the necessary reforms to improve productivity and correct institutional and eco-
nomic imbalances. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013) have called this process
political credit cycle, and argue that the ﬂow of credit after the EMU led to a
relaxation of constraints that reduced incentives for reform and led to the insti-
tutional deterioration that precipitated the Great Recession.
While this remains a valid hypothesis, the truth is that there has been very
little systematic empirical research linking variations in credit cycles and reform
activity, with some very valuable exceptions (Vamvakidis, 2007). Surely, one
reason why research in this area is still scarce is the limited availability of good
data on reforms as well as the diﬃculties of building research designs that cap-
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ture causal mechanisms in complex institutional developments, across countries,
in EMU. The ﬁrst chapter of this thesis provides some preliminary evidence of
a positive relationship between the boom of cheap credit and a slowdown in
reforms in certain EMU countries. Further research is needed to explore other
mechanisms that might be involved in this, still largely unexplored, relationship.
The boom years barely lasted a decade. When the crisis began a new period
for reforms started in EMU. While in previous years reform activity had been
slow, particularly in the South, the ﬁrst years of the crisis led to a boost in re-
form activity. The sudden stop of credit, the spectacular rise in unemployment
and the inescapable external constraints - in some cases with very stringent IMF
and EU bailout programmes - led to some major structural reforms in a num-
ber of southern European economies. Spain implemented ambitious reforms in
its banking system and the labour market. Greece went through a traumatic
reform process, involving deep transformations in its welfare state, pension sys-
tem, labour and product markets. Portugal also implemented ambitious growth
enhancing reforms and structural ﬁscal savings.
However, the reform process, albeit intense, did not last long either. As soon
as the credit limitations started to relax, as a result of the ease in monetary
conditions by the ECB, and growth returned to most countries, the rhythm of
reforms slowed down signiﬁcantly again. In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I discuss the
labour market reform activity over the last two decades, distinguishing between
the South and core European countries.
Two observations emerge when looking at reform activity in Europe. The
ﬁrst is not new: reforms activity increases in times of crisis. However, a sec-
ond observation also emerges: we don't have a solid understanding of reform
dynamics in the expansionary part of the cycle. Besides crises such as the Great
Recession or external constraints, what other variables push countries to im-
plement reform? The evidence shown in my research points to the idea that
domestic political economy dynamics are crucial to understand reform activ-
ity and that diﬀerent policy areas require diﬀerent frameworks of study. For
instance, even within the same welfare regimes, power relations in the labour
market are very diﬀerent from each other.
This leads me to the other initial idea that caught up my attention during
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my research, especially when I became a full-time politician three years ago, as
a member of the Spanish parliament. As I had studied, external constraints
were crucial for understanding the reform process, and they seemed key to push
countries to implement reforms. However, the speciﬁc design of these reforms
in many cases turned out to be far from optimal, and in some cases detrimen-
tal to solve the actual problems that countries were facing. When looking at
the Spanish labour market this became sadly apparent: How was it possible
that Spain, despite having evolved so well in so many areas, had still such large
labour market imbalances? How was it possible that despite reaching European
record unemployment levels throughout the Great Recession, the employment
protection legislation of permanent workers was barely altered?
These questions led me to further investigate the political economy of spe-
ciﬁc reforms. It seemed obvious that in order to understand reforms well and do
useful comparative work, one needed to look much closer at the direction, scope
and ambition of these reforms and also, for instance, at what segments of the
population these reforms were actually aﬀecting. Recent work by Boeri (2011)
on labour market reforms in Europe became very useful to help me understand
the diﬀerent dimensions of this debate. I decided to focus on the political econ-
omy of reform of dual labour markets to try to ﬁnd, within the limited research
available, some common patterns of reform. In my research on the politics of
duality I identify some relevant gaps in the literature that seem fruitful avenues
for further research.
In the ﬁrst chapter, I address two straightforward questions. First, whether
ﬁnancial windfalls, such as booms of cheap credit, are associated with less policy
reform and more corruption. Second, whether strong institutions help to miti-
gate the negative eﬀects of credit windfalls. I present preliminary evidence for
the EMU, for the period preceding the Great Recession, showing that countries
that experienced a higher windfall of credit implemented a lower number of re-
forms and experienced a higher increase in corruption.
I propose two diﬀerent mechanisms that might explain these correlations.
First, booms act as an institutional mirage for the economy: everything seems
to be going well, the economy grows and jobs are being created, so voters relax
their demands for reforms and governments have fewer incentives to implement
them. This signalling problem was ﬁrst pointed out by Fernandez-Villaverde
12
et al. (2013), and my paper supports their theory with some initial empirical
evidence for the case of the EMU.
The second mechanism is related to the literature on the so-called resource
course and, to the best of my knowledge, new in its application to credit booms:
ﬁnancial windfalls (like a large oil discovery), in interaction with poor institu-
tions, may act as a catalyser for corruption. In highly politicized institutional
environments, with grabber friendly institutions (Robinson et al., 2006) and
weak checks and balances - such as those found in some Southern European
economies - the ﬂow of credit reinforces on-going perverse institutional dynam-
ics such as rent-seeking and clientelism.
The results of my ﬁrst chapter are relevant for a number of reasons. First,
while the relationship between crisis and reforms has been largely explored in the
literature on the political economy of reform, a lot less work has been dedicated
to understanding the interaction between credit booms and reforms. My work
adds to the evidence that periods of economic bonanza might be detrimental for
reforms, but also provides an original hypothesis on some perverse institutional
dynamics, speciﬁcally associated with ﬁnancial windfalls, that deserve further
investigation.
The paper also adds to the existing literature regarding reforms in the EMU.
A good amount of work has been done regarding reforms in the Great Recession
as well as on reforms and EMU convergence criteria. However, less attention has
been paid to what happened to reforms in the period in between. In terms of
policy lessons, this paper reinforces the view that European institutions should
be paying special attention to reforms, particularly in times when the economy
is booming.
Surely in terms of research design, the ﬁrst chapter has some limitations as
the initial quality of institutions is diﬃcult to disentangle from the institutional
deterioration that came after, as a result of the ﬁnancial windfall. Also the mea-
surements for the quality of institutions and corruption are far from optimal, as
they are often based on perceptions, which might also be biased by the cycle.
The ﬁrst chapter opens some avenues for further research. A more compre-
hensive theoretical framework on the relationship between ﬁnancial booms and
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reforms needs to be built. Furthermore, the literature on corruption would also
beneﬁt from further exploring the eﬀects of windfalls on rent-seeking behaviour
by governments.
In the second chapter I review the literature on the political economy of re-
forms in the EMU, in this case focusing on dual labour market reforms. Dual
labour markets are characterised by stark diﬀerences in job protection faced
by permanent works (the so-called insiders) and temporary workers (so-called
outsiders). I address an on-going puzzle, particularly relevant for Southern Eu-
ropean economies: why are dual labour markets so persistent? Given that there
is wide consensus on the negative eﬀects of dual labour market systems on the
economy, I try to contribute to understanding why the insider-outsider divide is
still widening, rather than narrowing, in so many European countries.
This question is of utmost importance for policy makers because temporality,
youth unemployment and work precariousness are central concerns for govern-
ments, and these are directly linked to duality. My hope is that this review
may help to shed some light on how to overcome the diﬃculties encountered by
governments in reforming two-tier labour markets.
While most of the literature focuses on the eﬀects two-tier systems on labour
market outcomes and other economic variables, much less attention has been
paid to the actual drivers of duality. I document some theoretical and empirical
insights that might help to provide a more coherent understanding of the per-
sistence of duality, as well as on when and why the wedge between insiders and
outsiders might be reduced.
Duality is persistent by nature, as insiders tend to outnumber outsiders and
are better organized. The political inﬂuence of insiders in designing the policy
agenda today clearly outweighs that of the outsiders, despite the latter group
having grown in size persistently over time. This inﬂuence is exercised mainly
through two mechanisms: trade unions and political parties. This review rein-
forces the idea that despite the deep transformations that have occurred in the
labour markets over the last decades, trade unions have not managed to inter-
nalize in any meaningful way the interests of outsiders, and continue to represent
the preferences of insiders across diﬀerent European welfare regimes.
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While trade unions have lost a signiﬁcant amount of social support, they
have managed to preserve a strong inﬂuence, mainly through collective bargain-
ing structures, which emerge as a crucial, often overlooked factor to explain the
persistence of duality. It is through these bargaining tables that trade unions
manage to, de facto, inﬂuence wage levels and ﬁrms' ﬂexibility to adapt to the
economic cycle, which are crucial to determine the insider-outsider divide. A
ﬁrst conclusion from this ﬁnding is that in order to understand the reasons
for the stickiness of two-tier labour markets, further research should focus on
the varieties of collective bargaining structures across European welfare regimes.
Secondly, this review concentrates on another issue that remains puzzling in
the literature: do outsiders actually show political preferences that are system-
atically diﬀerent than those of insiders?
I don't ﬁnd conclusive evidence that supports the central assumption in the
classic insider-outsider theory that insiders and outsiders have diﬀerent politi-
cal preferences. If that assumption does not hold, and the political preferences
of insiders do not actually diverge from those of outsiders, it would be absurd
to expect outsiders to organize themselves to ﬁght duality, thus becoming also
agents of the status-quo.
As regards to the drivers of reforms that reduce the duality wedge, this paper
also adds two relevant contributions. First, I point to the economic cycle as a
key driver of reforms in EMU. While most of the existing literature focuses on
the politics of reform in the bad part of the cycle, I provide some evidence on
what happens to labour-market reforms in periods of bonanza. What the data
shows is that over expansionary periods in EMU the rhythm of labour-market
reforms drops abruptly and the insider-outsider wedge does not change.
The second ﬁnding might open a relevant nuance for the study of the political
economy of reforms of dual labour markets in Europe: while there is no conclu-
sive evidence in the literature that crisis lead to duality reducing reforms, this
paper shows that the interaction between economic hardship and EMU surveil-
lance seems to be more eﬀective at reducing the insider-outsider divide.
The main contribution of the paper is that it is, to the best of my knowledge,
the ﬁrst attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of the speciﬁc literature on
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the reasons for the persistence and the drivers of reform in dual labour markets
in Europe, which might be useful for both further research and policy guidance.
.Overall, I believe this thesis is original in its approach to the study of policy
reforms in EMU, as it contributes to enrich, drawing on evidence from a variety
of sources and disciplines, the empirical and theoretical work in two areas of
research within the ﬁeld that are underexplored.
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Chapter 1
Financial Windfalls and
Institutional Deterioration:
Evidence from the EMU
Abstract: Is cheap credit going to harm your institutions? In this paper I ar-
gue that while ﬁnancial windfalls pose an important test to the economy, their
eﬀects will depend crucially on the institutional quality at the beginning of the
windfall. I present some preliminary evidence for the European Monetary Union
to support that hypothesis. I observe that those countries that experienced the
highest windfall have experienced the sharpest institutional deterioration. How-
ever, I show that initial institutions crucially mitigate the negative eﬀects of
windfalls on institutions. Moreover, I propose a political mechanism to explain
why this may occur. I argue that weak institutions in interaction with a ﬁnancial
windfall may easily be appropriated by the initial winners of the bubble, lead-
ing to a self-fulﬁlling reproduction of the bubble and more intense institutional
deterioration.
1.1 Introduction
The Economist deﬁnes Windfall Gains as income you do not expect, such as
winning a lottery prize. Paradoxically, evidence shows that countries experienc-
ing unexpected inﬂows of money do not necessarily improve their performance.
For instance, resource booms, such as oil windfalls, have been found to be detri-
mental for growth, either through market or institutional mechanisms (Frankel,
2010). Similarly, aid transfers, instead of promoting development, have been
associated with rent-seeking and institutional deterioration through a shift in
interest groups incentives Svensson (2000); Casella and Eichengreen (1994). In
the same way, ﬁnancial windfalls, such as booms of cheap credit, have been
linked to a general relaxation of constraints, lower reform capacity and, ulti-
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mately, poor growth performance (Vamvakidis, 2007).
Large windfalls of income pose a challenge to those that receive them. How-
ever, the detrimental eﬀects of windfalls are not inevitable. The extensive lit-
erature on the resource course has focused on the interaction of resources and
institutions to explain the diﬀerent developmental paths followed by resource
abundant economies like Norway and Venezuela. In the same way, while in
many parts of Africa aid has not been used for productive activities, evidence
shows that it has helped others, such as Botswana, to develop (Acemoglu et al.,
2002). Recently, some political economists have pointed to the importance of the
political interaction between windfalls and institutions: For instance, (Robinson
et al., 2006, p. 247) argue that:
The overall impact of resource booms in the economy depends crit-
ically on institutions since these determine the extent to which po-
litical incentives map into policy outcomes.
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013) explore these ideas in a recent work in
relation to the European Monetary Union (EMU) experience. They argue that
due to the credit windfall in the periphery, during the years that followed the
entrance in the Euro, reforms were abandoned and institutions deteriorated.
They also point to the idea that politics played a central role in the way ﬁnan-
cial windfalls interacted with institutions, and open the door for an interesting
empirical investigation.
In this paper I present some preliminary evidence in support of four hypothe-
ses as regards to the relationship between ﬁnancial windfalls and institutions: I
argue that (1) ﬁnancial windfalls pose a test to existing institutions, but insti-
tutional deterioration is not inevitable and (2) crucially depends on the initial
quality of institutions. These explain why the eﬀects of ﬁnancial windfalls are
non-homogeneous; at the same level of windfall shock countries with worse ini-
tial institutions deteriorate relatively more than those with good - defensive -
institutions. Finally, (3) the crucial mechanism by which windfalls become detri-
mental is political rather than economic.
I give support to the ﬁrst two hypotheses by analysing data on 12 EMU
countries. The results are coherent with the predictions: (1) as argued by the
literature, the EMU Financial Windfall is strongly correlated with our two mea-
sures of Institutional Deterioration in the selected sample; (2) our variables
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Initial Institutions in 1999 - when the 12 countries entered the Euro parity -
are strongly correlated with the Institutional Deterioration experienced during
the EMU years and (3) the interaction between Financial Windfall and Initial
Institutions is statistically signiﬁcant for the four diﬀerent measures of Initial
Institutions. That is, at the same level of windfall shock, countries with worse
initial institutions deteriorated relatively more than those with good ones. This
would support the idea of the non-homogeneous character of the relationship
between ﬁnancial windfalls and initial institutions.
Finally I present a case study on the political economy of the Spanish Boom
as an example of the importance of initial political dynamics and institutions in
determining the way ﬁnancial windfalls map into economic outcomes. I argue
that a speciﬁc type of historical, political and ﬁnancial institution and certain
regulatory changes allowed the initial winners of the bubble (real estate de-
velopers and local saving banks) to capture political power (at the municipal
level). My point is: if existing institutions allow the winners of the bubble
to lock in their economic power today by transforming existing institutions to
their interest, the country will inevitably suﬀer a (ﬁnancial) windfall course. If,
on the contrary, institutions are prepared to counteract the test posed by the
boom, the country may avoid the detrimental eﬀects of the ﬁnancial windfall.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 1.2 covers the
literature review in two diﬀerent subsections, one that focuses on windfalls in
general and another on institutions. Section 1.3 presents the theoretical frame-
work. Section 1.4 presents the empirical strategy and preliminary results. In
section 1.5 I present a short case study on Spain. Section 1.6 concludes.
1.2 Related Literature
In this section, I explore the core ideas for conceptualising the relationship be-
tween ﬁnancial windfalls and institutions. In the ﬁrst subsection, I propose a
new classiﬁcation of diﬀerent windfall views into three large groups: (1) the
economist view, which focuses on the economic eﬀects of windfalls (2) the in-
stitutionalist view, which looks at the eﬀects of windfalls on institutions, and
the (3) political economy view, which focuses on the political dimensions of the
interaction between windfalls and institutions. I draw from the literature on the
resource course, ﬁnancial booms, aid and development and the political econ-
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omy of reform. In the second section I present an overview of the literature on
institutions and the quality of governance.
1.2.1 Resources, Windfalls, Reforms, Institutions and Pol-
itics: Three Views
Empirical studies show that being wealthy in resources can be, paradoxically,
a course for currently developing nations. Sachs and Warner (2001) show that,
countries with abundant resources have had lower average growth rates in the
postwar period than resource-poor economies. Even though it is conventional
wisdom that resource abundance may represent a challenge for development,
there is no agreement in the literature as regards to what are the mechanisms
that might explain this paradox.
The economist view is associated with the so-called Dutch Disease theory.1
That is, a resource boom - such as a boom in the prize of oil in an oil exporting
country - leads to a sectorial reallocation of productive factors (crowding out)
in response to a favorable shock emanating from either a resource discovery or
an increase in the price of some commodity. Typically this draws factors of
production out of relatively more productive activities producing traded com-
modities - to be substituted by imports that become relatively cheaper - and
into non-traded sectors. As a consequence, a resource boom hinders growth via
a market mechanism, notably an appreciation of the real exchange rate (Sachs
and Warner, 2001).
The problem of the economist view is that by ignoring institutions it misses
part of the story. While in countries such as Venezuela or Sierra Leone resource
wealth has led to institutional deterioration, rent seeking and stagnation, in
places like Canada, Norway or Australia, resources have been important drivers
of growth (Mehlum et al., 2006). Gelb (1988), in his comprehensive study of
six oil-exporting countries, argues that it is the eﬃciency with which the extra
revenues are used what will determine the eﬀect of the boom in the economy.
He focuses attention on the interaction between institutions and resources.
Institutionalist Views Gelb (1988) is in fact the ﬁrst to point out two of
the most important eﬀects of windfalls on institutions: the (1) ﬁscal and (2)
1See Frankel (2010) for a comprehensive summary of broader arguments within the
economist view category.
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rent-seeking eﬀects. He argues that windfall gains relax the general constraints
in the economy, reduce the incentives for monitoring others and lead politicians
to focus on obtaining gains for their own constituency.
Some papers have formalised Gelb's idea that resource windfalls produce an
alteration of incentives leading agents to non-cooperative rent-seeking activities.
Lane and Tornell (1996) argue that the combination of a weak institutional
structure and fractionalisation inside the governing elite generates slow growth,
through the voracity eﬀect. Torvik (2009), on the other hand, argues that
a greater amount of natural resources increases the number of entrepreneurs
engaged in rent-seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running pro-
ductive ﬁrms. Similar institutionalist arguments have been explored in the lit-
erature on development aid and the political economy of reforms. Casella and
Eichengreen (1994) show that the prospect of aid exacerbates the delay in stabil-
isation by inducing social groups to postpone making sacriﬁces.2 Closer to the
hypotheses presented here, (Svensson, 2000, p.457) recognises that the eﬀects
of development aid critically depend on the political equilibrium of the recipient
country, but pictures windfalls as having a somehow depoliticised and mono-
tonic eﬀect on institutions depending on the number of competing social groups.
Similar to the empirical analysis presented here, Vamvakidis (2007) extends
the argument to include foreign borrowing by the private sector and provides
empirical support to the idea that easily available external ﬁnancing causes a
relaxation of institutional constraints. The argument is simple: when budget
constraints become looser or there is easy access to ﬁnancial capital, through aid
or cheap external ﬁnancing, governments tend to delay adjustment. Incumbents
do not reform until things get really bad in the economy. The proxy he uses for
ﬁnancial windfalls is the External Debt-to-GDP ratio. Similarly, Borio (2012)
argues that during ﬁnancial booms not only the balance sheets of ﬁnancial insti-
tutions improve, but also the ﬁscal accounts of governments due the pro-cyclical
nature of public revenues.
In their analysis of the ﬁnancial windfall caused by the Euro, Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. (2013) add one more mechanism to the idea that ﬁnancial
windfalls may be detrimental for the economy:(3) the signalling eﬀect. Financial
2They use a classic war of attrition game theoretical model proposed by Alesina and Drazen
(1991)
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windfalls, they argue, aﬀect the ability of principals to extract the right signals
from the economy by altering selection (bad managers and politicians remain)
and incentives (less eﬀort is needed to win elections). In their paper they point to
a political eﬀect of windfalls although they do not elaborate on its implications
(it is not the focus of their paper). They argue that:
Weakened institutions aﬀect the political-economic equilibrium by
strengthening the forces against reform and providing few rewards
for those in favor. Normally political success will reﬂect economic
success: if a group grows richer, its lobby power will be larger ... 
(Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2013, p. 11)
The missing link of the institutionalist arguments is the actual interaction of
the windfall with the existing distribution of power among the diﬀerent interest
groups at the domestic level, and how this turns into institutional deterioration
or not. Crucial redistributive eﬀects of windfalls and more nuanced dimensions
of power explain, I will argue, the non-homogeneous eﬀect of windfalls in the
economy.
The Political Economy View I see an essential diﬀerence between the po-
litical economy view and the two views presented above. While the other views
focus their attention on a speciﬁc direction of causality - the eﬀects of ﬁnancial
(resource or other type of) windfalls on the economy or existing institutions -
political economists look at the actual interaction between windfalls and insti-
tutions.
Mehlum et al. (2006) use the same data by Sachs and Warner (2001) to
present the opposite argument as regards to the resource course. The authors
argue that it is the quality of institutions what actually determines whether
countries avoid the resource course or not. Interestingly they diﬀerentiate be-
tween grabber friendly and producer friendly institutions and conclude that
natural resources put the institutional arrangements to a test, so that the re-
source curse only appears in countries with inferior institutions (Mehlum et al.,
2006, p. 6).
Robinson et al. (2006) move a bit further in the same direction and propose an
explicitly political model of resource extraction. In their model, resource income
can be used in either of two ways; the incumbent can consume the income or
he can distribute it as patronage - in the form of public sector employment- to
inﬂuence the outcome of an election. They argue that:
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Low quality institutions invite bad policy choices since they allow
politicians to engage in ineﬃcient redistribution in order to inﬂuence
the outcomes of elections. High quality institutions make such po-
litical strategies infeasible or relatively unattractive.
(Robinson et al., 2006, p. 450)
They point crucially at the initial role of institutions as a key political driver
of the eﬀects of windfalls on institutions. Rather than changes in the economic
structure, they believe that shifts on political incentives triggered by resource
booms are the main drivers of the resource course.
1.2.2 Institutions and the Quality of Governance
There is no agreement in the literature as regards to what governance actually
means. While some have focused mainly on functionalist approaches deﬁning it
as good-for-economic-development (La Porta et al., 1999, p. 233), others have
highlighted more normative criteria. For instance, Rothstein and Teorell (2008)
link quality of government to the concept of impartial government institutions:
when public oﬃcials who implement policies do not take anything about the
citizen/case into consideration that is not beforehand stipulated in the policy or
the law. On the other hand, several scholars have pointed out to the diﬀerence
between governance and democracy. If quality of government was considered to
be the same as democracy, the importance of how power is actually exercised
would be left out (Charron et al., 2010).
In this paper, for practical purposes, I use the deﬁnition of the World Bank,
the most widely used in the literature. Governance is deﬁned as the traditions
and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised. This includes: (1)
the process by which governments are selected, monitored, and replaced, (2) the
capacity of the government to eﬀectively formulate and implement sound poli-
cies, and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern
economic and social interactions among them. (Kaufmann et al., 2009, p. 3).
While I recognise that no deﬁnition is self-suﬃcient, it is not my intention
to explore here all the nuances of the theoretical debate in the literature. I
follow the high degree of consensus as regards to certain concepts on which we
should focus. I take as a reference The World Governance Indicators (WDI)
ﬁve dimensions of governance : (1) corruption; (2) rule of law; (3) government
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eﬀectiveness; (4) voice and accountability and (5) regulatory quality.3
Quality of Governance in Europe Although quality governance issues have
been generally a topic in the study of developing economies, quality of gover-
nance matters also in the EU. Recent studies have pointed to the large variation
across (and within) countries of governance indicators (Tabellini, 2010; Charron
and Lapuente, 2011). Looking at the evolution in recent years of these diﬀerent
governance indicators there are substantial diﬀerences among countries. Overall,
the data does not suggest relevant improvements since 1995s. Conversely, what
we see is a negative trend starting in 2008 - 2009 when the crisis ﬁrst hit Europe.
This trend seems to aﬀect more acutely those countries in the periphery that
suﬀered a larger ﬁnancial windfall (Charron et al., 2012).
1.3 Theoretical Framework
When the EMU was booming diﬀerences in the quality of government did not
seem to be so important and some of the countries that are experiencing today,
some embarrassing cases of corruption (such as Ireland) were performing among
the world's best. When the boom ended, however, the crisis brought to the
surface the eﬀects of years of unseen deterioration. A way of capturing such
deterioration is by looking at the performance in the ranking of perception on
corruption of Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (CPI).
Figure 1.1 below shows the deterioration in CPI rank for selected EMU countries.
At similar levels of windfall, we can clearly see that there is a wide variation in
terms of the change in the CPI ranking.
The variation in this index from 1999 (year in which the parities were ﬁxed to
the Euro) to 2012 is the proxy I will use to measure Institutional Deterioration
in the empirical analysis. Just a ﬁrst look table 1.1 suggests three interest-
ing ideas. Firstly, we see that all countries worsen their position in the ranking,
which would give support to the idea explored in the literature that the EMU Fi-
nancial Windfall had a detrimental eﬀect on institutions (Fernandez-Villaverde
et al., 2013). Secondly, we observe that the two countries that deteriorate the
most are the two countries that were originally worst positioned in the ranking.
This suggests that the initial level of governance is relevant as regards to the
3I exclude a sixth indicator on Political Stability and the Absence of Violence because it is
not relevant for the purpose of this study.
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Figure 1.1: Institutional Deterioration from 1999-2012 for selected EMU
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Notes: CPI Rank data from Transparency International.
impact of the ﬁnancial windfall on institutional deterioration. Bad institutions
seem to be drivers of even worse institutions. This could be explained by the
size of the windfall: larger windfalls cause larger deterioration. Yet, (this is
the third observation) the size of the windfall does not have an homogeneous
impact. For example, while Spain suﬀered a credit windfall larger than Italy
(as measured here) its eﬀects on overall perceived corruption were not closely as
signiﬁcant. The idea is even more clear if we look at Belgium: At a similar level
of windfall as experienced by Italy, it saw its position in the CPI rank increase by
13 positions. The point that I am trying to make with this anecdotal evidence
is that what matters to understand the full eﬀect of windfalls is the quality of
institutions when the windfall begins.
In line with the literature on the resource course (Boschini (2007), Mehlum
et al. (2006), Robinson et al. (2006)) I argue that the important question for
ﬁnancial windfalls as well is whether the country has good quality of institutions
at the time when the ﬁnancial windfall starts. Depending on that, windfall gains
will be used wisely in the beneﬁt of national welfare or be extracted by the elite
and cause institutional deterioration.
Financial windfalls have crucial redistributive eﬀects. They have winners and
losers. The way domestic power rebalances when a windfall occurs is crucial in
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Table 1.1: Windfalls and Change in Corruption Index (CPI) Rank
Country
Av.
Credit
to private
Sector
(1980-
1998)
Av.
Credit
to private
Sector
(1999-
2008)
Varia-
tion
average
credit
(%)
CPI
Rank
1999
CPI
Rank
2012
Varia-
tion
CPI
Rank
Austria 0.86 1.42 65% 17 25 -8
Belgium 0.74 1.65 124% 29 16 13
Denmark 1.14 1.70 50% 1 1 0
Finland 0.89 1.38 55% 2 2 0
Germany 0.91 1.27 40% 14 13 1
Greece 0.18 0.77 338% 36 94 -58
Ireland 0.68 1.88 175% 15 25 -10
Italy 0.40 0.91 130% 38 72 -34
Netherlands 0.93 1.93 107% 8 9 -1
Portugal 0.67 1.85 176% 21 33 -12
Spain 0.46 1.34 193% 22 30 -8
Sweden 1.06 1.78 68% 3 4 -1
Notes: Change in Credit : Percentage increase in the average total adjusted
credit to the private sector from 1980-1998 versus 1999-2008, Source: Bank for
International Settlements, Long series on credit to private non-ﬁnancial sectors.
Change in CPI Rank : Diﬀerence between the Transparency International Cor-
ruption Perception Index ranking in 1999 versus the ranking in 2012, Source:
Transparency International.
determining the outcome of such windfall. The economic winners in a boom
will see their political position reinforced with the windfall. When a particular
group becomes rich relative to others, this will increase its de facto power and
enable it to push for economic and political institutions favorable to its interests
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008). The point is whether existing institutions will
resist the push or not. Certain types of institutions - grabber friendly institu-
tions - will allow the relative economic winners of a boom to transform their
economic power into de facto political power. This is the crucial mechanism
that leads to rent-seeking, corruption, overspending and general institutional
deterioration. But these eﬀects are not inevitable. I argue that the ﬁnancial
windfall will not weaken institutions in a homogeneous manner. In the same
way that in Norway an oil boom does not lead to institutional deterioration, in
Belgium or the Netherlands the EMU Financial Windfall was not detrimental
for the economy.
The three hypotheses I am considering here and test in the next section are the
following:
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H1: Financial windfalls do not have a homogeneous eﬀect on institutional
deterioration. While they pose a test to existing institutions, the variation is
not a linear function of the size of the windfall.
H2: The eﬀect of ﬁnancial windfalls on institutional deterioration depends
crucially on the quality of institutions at the beginning of the bubble. Countries
that suﬀer from grabber institutions (Robinson et al., 2006) will see their in-
stitutional quality deteriorate while countries enjoying producer friendly insti-
tutions may be able to counteract the negative eﬀects provoked by the ﬁnancial
windfall. This works for the three eﬀects considered in the literature: (1) the
ﬁscal eﬀect, the (2) rent-seeking eﬀect and the (3) signalling eﬀect.
H3: The reason of such deterioration is the political eﬀect of the windfall.
In countries with poorer institutions the likelihood that the windfall will be po-
litically appropriated by the coalition that resists reforms is higher.
1.4 Empirical Analysis
In this section, I explore more in depth the theories presented in the previous
sections and give empirical support to my three hypotheses. In what follows I
present a description of the data I use and descriptive statistics, a section show-
ing correlations between the EMU windfall, on the one hand, and structural
reforms and institutional deterioration, on the other; and in the last part of this
section I show correlations between initial quality of governance and institu-
tional deterioration caused by the EMU windfall. Finally, I show simple linear
regressions of institutional deterioration against windfall shocks, controlling for
initial institutions, and contrast these to regressions including the interaction be-
tween the two variables. All the results give support to the hypotheses presented
above: while windfalls represent an important test for institutions, their eﬀect
is heterogeneous and depends, crucially, on the initial quality of institutions.
1.4.1 Description of the Data
Financial Windfalls Data: The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) has
constructed long series on credit to the private non-ﬁnancial sector for 40 economies,
both advanced and emerging. Credit is provided by domestic banks, all other
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sectors of the economy and non-residents. The "private non-ﬁnancial sector" in-
cludes non-ﬁnancial corporations (both private-owned and public-owned), house-
holds and non-proﬁt institutions serving households as deﬁned in the System of
National Accounts 2008. In terms of ﬁnancial instruments, credit covers loans
and debt securities. The series have quarterly frequency but I used the data
on the last quarter of the year only to match data available on reforms and
governance quality. The data for each country include i) credit to private non-
ﬁnancial sectors by domestic banks and ii) total credit to private non-ﬁnancial
sectors. Moreover, for most countries, total credit is broken down into iii) credit
to non-ﬁnancial corporations and iv) credit to households and non-proﬁt insti-
tutions serving households. For the purposes of this paper I have chosen the
total credit to non-ﬁnancial sector for the construction of the windfall variable.
The way I constructed this variable is by looking at the percent increase of total
credit in the economy between the average before the introduction of the Euro
(1980-1998) and the average post introduction of the Euro (1999-2009). While
the database covers 40 countries since 1945 I have adapted my selection to the
data available on number of structural reforms, which includes 12 EMU coun-
tries since 1980.
Reforms data: The FRDB Social Reforms Database provided by Fondazione
Rodolfo De Bendetti (http://www.frdb.org) is a database that collects infor-
mation about social reforms in the EU-15 member states (except Luxembourg)
over the period 1980-2007. The database contains qualitative features of social
reforms, which are classiﬁed along two main dimensions: direction (increasing/
decreasing ﬂexibility of the system) and scope (marginal/ radical reforms). The
following four areas of labour market reforms are included: Employment Pro-
tection Legislation, Non-Employment Beneﬁts, Public Pension Systems and Mi-
gration Policy. For each policy area, the following information is provided: (1)
Cumulative number of reforms implemented in a country or region since 1980;
(2) Direction: e.g. increasing or decreasing the ﬂexibility of the systems due to
reforms; (3) Index of coherence among all the measures within the same reform;
(4) Number of measures/interventions related to each reform (5) Number of re-
forms implemented in a country during the same year; (6) Scope: structural
or marginal reform. For the purposes of this analysis I use only those reforms
that are deﬁned as structural and increasing, that is, high impact reforms that
increased market ﬂexibility and rewards from labor market participation.4
4Countries covered are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Greece, Ireland,
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Institutional Deterioration - Quality of Governance data: As discussed above I
use 5 indicators of governance provided by the World Bank, World Governance
Indicators. These are the broad deﬁnitions of each indicator. Control of Cor-
ruption captures perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised
for private gain, including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well
as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests. Rule of Law captures
perceptions of the extent to which agents have conﬁdence in and abide by the
rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property
rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and vio-
lence. Government Eﬀectiveness captures perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from
political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and
the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Voice & and
Accountability captures perceptions of the extent to which a country's citizens
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of ex-
pression, freedom of association, and a free media. Regulatory Quality captures
perceptions of the ability of the government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector development.
It needs to be noted that the available data on institutions used in this work
has obvious shortcomings that limit the explanatory power of this empirical
analysis. Firstly, both the Transparency International data and the World Bank
data are based on subjective perceptions. These perceptions can be biased by
a variety of factors, including the economic cycle. Secondly, the initial quality
of institutions is diﬃcult to disentangle from the institutional deterioration that
came after, as a result of the ﬁnancial windfall, so there might also be problems
with endogeneity.
Table 1.2 shows the descriptive statistics of the ﬁnal dataset used for the
analysis. In this sample we can observe some important variations in the size
of the windfall experienced by the diﬀerent countries after 1998, with some
countries experiencing an increase of only 39.8% in total credit to the private
sector (Germany), and others experiencing an increase of as much as 398%
(Greece). On average, the countries in the sample undertook around 5 structural
Italy, The Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom. I exclude France due to
the lack of available data.
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reforms in the period since the introduction of the Euro. The most reformist
countries implemented as much as 11 such reforms (Finland and Germany), while
there were also countries that did not implement any structural reforms (Ireland,
Italy, Netherlands and Belgium). In terms of initial institutional quality in 1998,
with indices measured over a range from -2.5 to +2.5, we observe a relatively high
quality overall with mean values of the governance variables ranging between
1.305 for Regulatory Quality and 1.729 for Control of Corruption, and again,
high cross-country variations, with some countries exhibiting indices as low as
0.52 in the Control of Corruption category (Italy), or as high as 2.37 in the same
category (Finland).
Table 1.2: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
Change CPI Rank -9.833 18.838 -58 13 12
Change in Credit (Windfall) 1.267 0.854 0.398 3.379 12
Number of (+) Structural Reforms 4.833 4.783 0 11 12
Governance Variables
Control of Corruption 1.729 0.614 0.52 2.37 12
Regulatory Quality in 1998 1.305 0.404 0.66 1.89 12
Voice & Accountability in 1998 1.377 0.182 1.04 1.63 12
Government Eﬀectiveness in 1998 1.666 0.475 0.75 2.07 12
Rule of Law in 1998 1.461 0.422 0.72 1.97 12
Notes: Change in Credit : Percentage increase in the average total adjusted credit to
the private sector from 1980-1998 versus 1999-2008, Source: Bank for International
Settlements, Long series on credit to private non-ﬁnancial sectors. Number of (+)
Structural Reforms: Total number of structural reforms undertaken since 1999, (+)
means that the reforms were increasing the ﬂexibility of the system, or increasing
the rewards from labour market participation. Change in CPI Rank : Diﬀerence be-
tween the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index ranking in 1999
versus the ranking in 2012, Source: Transparency International. Governance Vari-
ables: Estimate of governance range from approximately -2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong)
governance performance, Source: The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2012 Up-
date, www.govindicators.org
1.4.2 Exploring Correlations for the Case of 12 EU Coun-
tries
This section is divided into two parts corresponding to the ﬁrst two hypothesis
presented in this paper. In the ﬁrst part of this section I will show some initial
supporting evidence for the hypothesis that the EMU windfall is associated
with institutional deterioration. The second part ﬁrst looks at some simple
correlations between initial institutions and institutional deterioration. I give
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some graphical support to the hypothesis as regards to the importance of existing
institutions at the beginning of the Euro to explain institutional deterioration
with the windfall. The evidence shows that indeed countries with initially better
institutions have experienced smaller institutional deterioration during and after
the crisis, and some have actually improved. I later explore whether institutions
existing prior to the arrival of the windfall matter for the impact of the windfall
on institutional deterioration. I show some simple linear regression results that
indicate that when I control for initial institutional quality, the eﬀect of a strong
windfall can be mitigated. At the same level of windfall shock, countries with
worse original institutions deteriorated relatively more than those with good
defensive original institutional structures that worked against the detrimental
windfall eﬀects.
Institutional Deterioration and Financial Windfalls
Here I present two graphs in which I measure Institutional Deterioration in two
diﬀerent ways: one refers to the relationship between the increase in total credit
and the increase in corruption and the other refers to the increase in total credit
and number of structural reforms.
Corruption and Financial Windfalls
As predicted by the theory we can observe a clear negative correlation be-
tween the corruption performance of the EMU countries (measured by their
variation in the CPI ranking) and the percentage increase in total credit in the
economy after 1999, our proxy for ﬁnancial windfall. Larger windfalls are clearly
associated with more severe institutional deterioration. This result goes hand
in hand with what is predicted in the literature on ﬁnancial windfalls and insti-
tutions (Vamvakidis, 2007; Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2013).
Reforms and Financial Windfalls
In line with what we can observe in ﬁgure 1.3 and as predicted by the liter-
ature, there is a negative correlation between the increase in average credit to
the economy and the number of structural reforms undertaken since the start of
the windfall. Countries that had available more credit also made less structural
reforms. While this association cannot be interpreted as causal, the data never-
theless supports the hypothesis that ﬁnancial windfalls may cause a pain-reliever
eﬀect, that is, they reduce the incentives for reforms as the economy performs
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Figure 1.2: Corruption and Financial Windfalls
Austria
Belgium
DenmarkFinland
Germany
Greece
Ireland
Italy
Netherlands
Portugal
Spain
Sweden
−6
0
−4
0
−2
0
0
20
In
sti
tu
tio
na
l D
et
er
ior
at
ion
 −
 ch
an
ge
 in
 C
PI
 R
an
k
0 1 2 3 4
Change in Credit (windfall)
Notes: Plot of Institutional deterioration - the change in the Transparency Interna-
tional Corruption Index Rank position from 1999 to 2012 (a negative number repre-
sents a decrease in the rank in 2012 as compared to 1999) against Change in Credit
- the percentage increase in the average total adjusted credit to the private sector
from 1980-1998 versus 1999-2008 (1 represents a 100% increase). The blue line repre-
sents predicted values from the linear regression. The shaded area represents the 95%
conﬁdence interval.
well.
Pre-windfall Institutions and the Eﬀect of Windfalls
I now move on to looking at the relationship between institutions existing prior
to the arrival of the windfall and the institutional deterioration during the wind-
fall. Institutional deterioration is again measured as the variation in position of
the CPI index from the time when the parities were ﬁxed to the Euro in 1999
to 2012. While some of the selected countries have seen almost no variation,
others have seen corruption increase substantially since the EMU was created
(particularly in the crisis period, see table 1.1 for details). The number of re-
forms are measured by the total number of increasing structural reforms, taken
from the Database by FRDB as explained above. Speciﬁcally, reforms will have
a positive sign if they: (1) increase the rewards from labor market participa-
tion -reduce the amount or the duration of non employment beneﬁts or makes
eligibility conditions stricter - and (2) that increase the increases the ﬂexibility
of the system (in particular making it easier for a companies to dismiss work-
ers). Initial institutions are measured by the World Governance Indicators (see
Section 1.4.1 for the description of the variables) in the year 1998.
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Figure 1.3: Reforms and Financial Windfalls
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Notes: Plot of the Number of (+) reforms measures the total number of (+) struc-
tural reforms since 1999 against the Change in Credit - percentage increase in the
average total adjusted credit to the private sector from 1980-1998 versus 1999-2008 (1
represents a 100% increase). The blue line represents predicted values from the linear
regression. The shaded area represents the 95% conﬁdence interval.
The evidence shown in Figures 1.4 and 1.5 support what I predicted in the
hypothesis that original institutions are a key driver of the institutional dete-
rioration associated with windfalls. Following the governance categories used
by the World Governance Indicators explored above (Government Eﬀectiveness,
Regulatory Quality, Control of Corruption and Voice & Accountability) I see
always the expected sign of the correlation. That is: the worse the countries
performed in each of the governance indicators at the beginning of the windfall
in 1999, the more have their institutions deteriorated in the period 1999-2012.
As argued in the theoretical model, countries with initially better institu-
tions are better able to mitigate the negative eﬀects of a windfall, or may even
turn them into something positive.
Below we estimate the following two speciﬁcations of a model of institutional
deterioration and windfalls.
∆INSTi = α + βWindfalli + γINST
pre
i +  (1.1)
∆INSTi = α + βWindfalli + γINST
pre
i + δWindfall ∗ INST pre + (1.2)
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Figure 1.4: Initial Quality of Governance and Institutional Deterioration - A
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(a) Government Eﬀectiveness in 1998
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(b) Rule of Law in 1998
Notes: Plot of the change in the CPI ranking from 1999 to 2012 against Quality
of Governance variables from The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2012 Update.
The blue line represents predicted values from the linear regression. The shaded area
represents the 95% conﬁdence interval.
∆INSTi represents institutional deterioration, Windfalli represents the size
of the windfall experienced by the economy indexed i, INST pre represents pre-
existing institutions, and  is a random error term. The second speciﬁcation
includes an interaction term. The theory predicts a positive sign for δ, meaning
that windfalls are not necessarily bad, or at least have a less negative eﬀect when
met with initially strong institutions.
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Regression (1) of table 1.3 presents results of a linear regression of the ﬁrst
speciﬁcation. The regression suggests a negative association between the change
in the CPI rank and the size of the windfall: An increase in the available credit
post-EUR by 100% is associated with a decline in the rank by about 14 posi-
tions. On the other hand, the coeﬃcient on initial institutions is non-signiﬁcant,
suggesting that initial institutions have no signiﬁcant correlation with institu-
tional deterioration.5
Table 1.3: Institutional Deterioration and Initial Control of Corruption
(1) (2)
Change CPI Rank Change CPI Rank
Change in Credit -13.8* (6.32) -55*** (14.9)
Control of Corruption 6.3 (8.8) -21.4* (11.5)
CoC * Change in Credit 31.7** (10.8)
Constant -3.3 (21.8) 37.7 (21.4)
Observations 12 12
R2 0.605 0.809
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Linear regression of change in Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tion Index ranking from 1999 to 2012 on the percentage change in adjusted average
credit to the private sector before and after introduction of the EURO and the value of
World Governance Indicator Control of Corruption in 1998. The second regression
includes the interaction term.
The right panel of table 1.3 shows the regression including the interaction
between the previous two independent variables. The coeﬃcient on the interac-
tion term is large, signiﬁcant and positive, suggesting that while countries with
larger windfalls experienced stronger deterioration in their institutions (the co-
eﬃcient on change in credit is -55), if initial institutions were strong, the eﬀect
of the windfall is mitigated. In fact countries with strong institutions at the
beginning of a windfall are able to increase their institutional quality with the
presence of a windfall.
5In Appendix 1.A.1 I also present the results of similar regressions using the other indicator
of quality of government.
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Figure 1.5: Initial Quality of Governance and Institutional Deterioration - B
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Notes: Plot of the change in the CPI ranking from 1999 to 2012 against Quality
of Governance variables from The Worldwide Governance Indicators, 2012 Update.
The blue line represents predicted values from the linear regression. The shaded area
represents the 95% conﬁdence interval.
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1.5 Political Process of Institutional Deteriora-
tion - A Case Study for the Spanish Con-
struction Bubble
In this section, I use the case of the Spanish construction bubble to support the
third hypothesis made in this paper, that is, that the mechanism through which
windfalls negatively aﬀect the economy and institutions is political rather than
solely economic.
Between 1999 and 2007, two thirds of the houses built in the European Union
were built in Spain. Growth in investment doubled real GDP growth in the same
period to ﬁnance an average of more than 500.000 new residential houses per
year. By 2006, the share of real estate loans in the books of some Spanish Saving
Banks, or Cajas, was of almost 50% (Montalvo (2007), Juan et al. (2011)). It
was the largest real-state bubble in the EU and the largest Spain has ever had.
Why was it not stopped earlier?
By March 2003 the Research Service of the Banco de España, the Span-
ish Central Bank, published a comprehensive study on the Spanish construc-
tion bubble (Montalvo, 2007). The conclusion was that housing was overvalued
by 20%. In the following years until the bubble burst in 2008, the IMF, The
Economist, the BBVA bank and many others documented on the systemic risks
of a credit-driven real estate boom, dangerously accompanied by unsustainable
current account deﬁcits and loss of competitiveness. But, as Arellano and Ben-
tolila (22Feb 2009) have pointed out, nothing was done.
Looking back it seems clear that some of the socio-psychological dynamics,
similar to those self-fulﬁlling waves of optimism famously described by Shiller
(2007) for the US housing bubble, were at play in Spain. But in order to under-
stand the surprising inaction by the government during the boom years, animal
spirits are not suﬃcient. I argue here that domestic political dynamics and insti-
tutions contributed to fuel the real-estate boom in the ﬁrst place and, secondly,
increased Spain's vulnerability to ﬁnancial crises by re-shifting internal power.
At the origin of these dynamics was what Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013) call
the Incestuous relation between Regions, Cajas and Developers. Here is one
interpretation of what happened:
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An exogenous rise in housing demand gave real estate developers a renewed
relative economic power. Naturally, the initial winners of the bubble aug-
mented their pressures on municipal and regional governments to support their
building agendas. But these governments were not ready to counteract the
windfall pressures, and economic interests quickly intertwined with political in-
terests. The reason is that local administrations were too permeable to the
inﬂuence of private interests. Lapuente (27 March 2009) has argued that part of
the explanation is that Spain has a Strong Mayor-type of system (as opposed
to the American more professionalized City Manager) in which the Mayor has
very limited constraints on power and few institutional watchdogs operate. This
facilitates higher levels of politisation and increases the risks of corruption. In-
stead of promoting a good quality bureaucracy, Strong Mayor systems give the
Mayor very much freedom as regards to hiring policies. For this reason this type
of system is associated with patronage, understood as the way in which party
politicians distribute public jobs or special favours in exchange of electoral sup-
port (Robinson et al., 2006, p. 379). When a large number of public employees
owe their job to a political appointment, clientelistic networks are more likely
to appear and reproduce (see Robinson et al. (2006) and Robinson and Verdier
(2002)) when the bubble starts developing. Windfalls reinforce the process be-
cause booms lead politicians to increase the extent of patronage in order to
stay in power (Robinson et al., 2006, p. 450). As a result, most managerial
positions in the regional and local administrations ended up being colonized by
the members of the clan with a clear objective in mind: winning the election
(Lapuente, 2011).
Large windfall rents and the high discretion to manage them are also highly
correlated to the regional ﬁscal proﬂigacy experienced in Spain (particularly
problematic when the bubble busted). Gelb (1988) argues that there is a ten-
dency for ill-prepared small administrations to spend the windfall revenues in
large, economically unsustainable projects. The case of the numerous pharaonic
public projects built in the region of Valencia is very illustrative of this. Airports
with no planes, ruinous Formula One circuits and theme parks without visitors
where built with public money leaving behind a massive pile of regional debt.
Overall, small municipalities enjoyed new earnings (great windfalls in some
areas) and the system favored the creation of a very powerful emerging coalition
that governed following particularistic interests in the detriment of the many.
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Meanwhile some crucial urban regulations as regards to the control over zoning
and planning by regions were relaxed from 1994 on at diﬀerent pace among re-
gions. These new regulations gave local governments almost complete power over
zoning and land qualiﬁcation (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2013) and municipal-
ities became monopolists selling a very precious good - land for construction.
Townships had a new manna from heaven: they could produce virtually as
many new construction licenses as they wanted (or at least as many as geo-
graphic limitations would allow) and become immensely rich through real estate
speculation.
The literature on corruption and rent-seeking has explored the large risks
involved when politicians or government oﬃcials enjoy high discretion in the
provision of scarce permits that are needed to carry certain lucrative economic
activities (see Krueger (1974) for a classic example of the same problem in rela-
tion to import licenses in India). In Spain happened what (Shleifer and Vishny,
1993, p. 10) call a free entry in the collection of bribes as politicians could
alter property rights to generate new rents to extract. These dynamics were
the perfect deal for politicians: money for their private pockets and money to
keep voters happy (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2013, p. 15).
All this could only happen because crucial ﬁnancial intermediaries, the Ca-
jas (Spanish Saving Banks) were ready to ﬁnance it. The Cajas are a genuinely
Spanish invention, with long historical roots as regional institutions that go back
to the 19th Century. They have traditionally captured the savings of small local
investors and used them to lend to small businesses. After a series of liber-
alizing reforms in the 1980's and 1990's the Cajas were allowed to engage in
all the functions in which the commercial banks engaged (Sagarra et.al 2011).
They grew in size and expanded massively over the Spanish territory - by 2009
one branch for every 1000 inhabitants, almost twice the density of the euro-area
average, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF, 2012). As a re-
sult of this expansion the Cajas gained market quota against commercial banks
(from 40% in 1991 to the 54.5% in 2007). Yet, they preserved their original legal-
institutional characteristics as non-for-proﬁt public commercial institutions that
do not have shareholders and can neither be acquired, nor merged with normal
commercial banks (only among them). Since they are not quoted in the stock
market, share price and other mechanisms that play an important role in banks
do not act as automatic disciplining channels (Cuñat and Garicano, 2010).
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Cajas have a general assembly and a board made up of representatives from
diﬀerent stakeholder groups: founding entities, depositors, employees and public
authorities. The latter group is formed by party appointed politicians by both
local and/or regional authorities. Already quite large evidence suggests the
Caja's risk and investment decisions were strongly inﬂuenced by their weak and
politicised governance systems (see Illueca et al. (2009) and Cuñat and Garicano
(2010)). They had an implicit government guarantee (a moral hazard problem
that played also a central in the Asian crisis, see Krugman) that allowed them
to borrow excessively and invest in highly risky real estate investments. The
Cajas were also winners of the bubble. And as long as the bubble continued
they could continue growing and ﬁnancing the dreams of local politicians (to
win elections) and of real estate developers (to become richer and richer).
These institutions were crucial in deﬁning the way in which the phenomenal
credit inﬂow that Spain enjoyed after the Euro entry translated into a self-
destructive construction boom. Existing institutions in Spain allowed economic
power to translate into political power. Understanding and preventing such
destructive political economy dynamics is of most relevance to prevent crisis in
the future.
1.6 Conclusion
Theories on the eﬀects of ﬁnancial windfalls have been normally presented in
the literature in isolation, rather than as a product of the interaction with ex-
isting domestic institutions. In this paper I have argued that initial institutions
matter to determine the way ﬁnancial windfalls turn into economic outcomes. I
have provided some preliminary empirical evidence that the eﬀect of windfalls
is statistically correlated with the quality of original institutions. In this way, I
provide support to the view that windfalls can be detrimental for the economy
as argued in the literature, but not in a homogenous way. I conclude that the
detrimental eﬀects of ﬁnancial windfalls in the economy are not inevitable: As
the evidence on the eﬀect of the EMU windfall shows, initial windfalls, when
met by strong initial institutions, do not necessarily have a negative eﬀect.
Moreover, I have argued for a politisation of the theory on ﬁnancial wind-
falls, escaping the rigid conventional demarcations of the economics literature.
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I have proposed a mechanism by which ﬁnancial windfalls can be detrimental.
I have argued that the political permeability of the established institutional
framework, the capacity with which economic interests translate into de facto
political power is crucial to understand the impact of any ﬁnancial windfall.
Finally, I have presented a case study on the Political Economy of the Spanish
Boom that provides further evidence of the theories presented.
Surely in terms of research design, the ﬁrst chapter has some limitations as
the initial quality of institutions is diﬃcult to disentangle from the institutional
deterioration that came after, as a result of the ﬁnancial windfall. Also the mea-
surements for the quality of institutions and corruption are far from optimal, as
they are often based on perceptions, which might also be biased by the cycle.
Further research will be required to test the hypotheses laid out in this paper.
In particular, it would be important to extend the analysis to a larger sample.
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1.A Appendix
1.A.1 Institutional Deterioration and Initial Institutions
Table 1.A.1: Institutional Deterioration and Initial Voice & Accountability
(1) (2)
Change CPI Rank Change CPI Rank
Change in Credit -11.6** (4.6) -62.4* (27.1)
Voice & Accountability in 1998 46* (21.6) -5.79 (33.3)
V&A 1998 * Change in Credit 41.4* (21.8)
Constant -58.6 (33.4) 8.19 (45.9)
Observations 12 12
R2 0.722 0.808
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Linear regression of change in Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tion Index ranking from 1999 to 2012 on the percentage change in adjusted average
credit to the private sector before and after introduction of the EURO and the value of
World Governance Indicator Voice & Accountability in 1998. The second regression
includes the interaction term.
Table 1.A.2: Institutional Deterioration and Initial Rule of Law
(1) (2)
Change CPI Rank Change CPI Rank
Change in Credit -11.4 (6.86) -34** (11.7)
Rule of Law in 1998 14.6 (13.9) -7.45 (15.3)
RoL * Change in Credit 21.4* (9.68)
Constant -16.7 (27.7) 9.85 (26.1)
Observations 12 12
R2 0.628 0.769
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Linear regression of change in Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tion Index ranking from 1999 to 2012 on the percentage change in adjusted average
credit to the private sector before and after introduction of the EURO and the value
of World Governance Indicator Rule of Law in 1998. The second regression includes
the interaction term.
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Table 1.A.3: Institutional Deterioration and Initial Government Eﬀectiveness
(1) (2)
Change CPI Rank Change CPI Rank
Change in Credit -5.35 (5.17) -23** (9.09)
Government Eﬀectiveness in 1998 27.3** (9.29) 8.45 (11.6)
GE 1998 * Change in Credit 13.6* (6.15)
Constant -48.6** (21.1) -19.6 (22)
Observations 12 12
R2 0.787 0.868
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Linear regression of change in Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tion Index ranking from 1999 to 2012 on the percentage change in adjusted average
credit to the private sector before and after introduction of the EURO and the value
of World Governance Indicator Government Eﬀectiveness in 1998. The second re-
gression includes the interaction term.
Table 1.A.4: Institutional Deterioration and Initial Regulatory Quality
(1) (2)
Change CPI Rank Change CPI Rank
Change in Credit -13.6** (5.2) -31.2** (11.9)
Regulatory Quality in 1998 13.2 (11) -8.85 (17)
RQ 1998 * Change in Credit 17.7 (11)
Constant -9.83 (19) 15 (23.3)
Observations 12 12
R2 0.640 0.728
Standard errors in parentheses
* p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Notes: Linear regression of change in Transparency International Corruption Percep-
tion Index ranking from 1999 to 2012 on the percentage change in adjusted average
credit to the private sector before and after introduction of the EURO and the value
of World Governance Indicator Regulatory Quality in 1998. The second regression
includes the interaction term.
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Chapter 2
The Political Economy of Dual
Labour Markets in Europe: A
Review
Abstract: Despite the overwhelming consensus on the negative eﬀects of dual
labour markets on the economy, governments strongly resist reforming these in-
stitutions. This paper provides a review of the existing literature on the political
economy of reform of dual labour markets. I address two questions in this re-
view. First, why are dual labour markets so persistent over time and, second,
what are the drivers of dual labour market reforms. I ﬁnd three insights that
should help develop further research in the area. First, despite the falling social
support of trade unions, collective bargaining structures continue to be a key
element for insiders to preserve their inﬂuence. Second, I don't ﬁnd conclusive
evidence that the political preferences of insiders actually diverge from those
of outsiders. This gap in the theory might explain, in turn, why duality is so
persistent. Third, I ﬁnd that economic hardship does lead to reforms. However,
I show that it is the interaction between crisis and EMU surveillance that seems
to lead to duality reducing reforms in Europe.
2.1 Introduction
The dramatic increase in unemployment towards the end of the 1970s and the
beginning of the 1980s led to a reformist push in Europe and the US. European
governments reacted in two diﬀerent ways. The ﬁrst consisted in strengthen-
ing the already stringent Employment Protection Legislation (EPL, hereafter),
with the objective of reducing job destruction. The second was to introduce more
labour market ﬂexibility at the margin, through the implementation of ﬂexible,
ﬁxed-term (or temporary, used interchangeably from now on) contracts, with
the aim of boosting job creation. The result was a spectacular rise in temporary
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work in some countries, particularly in southern European economies.
Duality is characterized by the existence of two types of workers: insiders,
with permanent contracts that enjoy strong employment protection and job sta-
bility, and the rest of the labour force, the outsiders, including the unemployed,
involuntarily underemployed, those on ﬁxed-term contracts that enjoy very lim-
ited employment protection as well as those working in the shadow economy.
The two types of workers, the insider-outsider theory assumes, have diﬀerent
interests, with insiders interested in preserving a high level of employment pro-
tection, and outsiders concerned about reducing rigidities so to have an easier
access to employment and job stability.
Today, according to Eurostat, dual labour markets are a widespread phe-
nomenon in the EU. In 2016, the proportion of employees' aged 15-74 in the
EU-28 with a contract of limited duration (ﬁxed-term employment) was 14.2%.
More than one in ﬁve employees in Poland (27.5%), Spain (26.3%), Croatia, Por-
tugal (both at 22.3%) and the Netherlands (20.8%) had a temporary contract.
Fixed-term contracts typically oﬀer small severance payments, few administra-
tive steps, and limited judicial costs, so they are much less costly for ﬁrms to
use than permanent (or open-ended, used interchangeably from now on) con-
tracts. But temporary jobs are also associated with low-skilled activities, low
pay, precarious conditions and minimal rights and beneﬁts. Some segments of
the labour market, such as young workers, women and low-skilled workers, are
signiﬁcantly more likely to hold temporary contracts than the rest of the labour
force.
Most part of the literature on dual labour markets has focused on the nega-
tive eﬀects of duality in labour market outcomes and the overall economy. As I
will show, two-tier labour markets are associated with high turnover levels and
lower investment in training and human capital, which translates in lower pro-
ductivity levels and higher unemployment. However, despite the overwhelming
consensus on the negative eﬀects of duality, little attention has been paid to
the reasons behind the strong persistence of labour market duality in EMU. In
fact, as I will show, over the years, European governments have passed a sub-
stantial number of labour market reforms. However, these reforms have rarely
contributed to reducing the insider-outsider divide (or wedge).
45
The goal of this paper is to provide an overview of the literature on the
political economy of reform of dual labour markets, with a focus on the causes
of duality and the drivers of reform. More speciﬁcally, two central questions
are addressed: (1) what are the power conﬁgurations that allow the duality
equilibrium to be so persistent over time and; (2) under what conditions such
equilibrium might change to facilitate reforms to reduce the wedge between in-
siders and outsiders.
The main ﬁndings of this review regarding the ﬁrst question are as follows.
First, dual labour markets are strongly persistent because the political inﬂu-
ence of insiders in designing the policy agenda continues to outweigh that of the
outsiders, despite the latter group having grown in size persistently over time
across the continent. Insiders are better organized and workers on permanent
contracts continue to exercise a strong inﬂuence through trade unions. This is
despite the deep transformations that have occurred in the labour markets over
the last decades. Trade unions have not managed to internalize in any mean-
ingful way the interests of outsiders, and continue to represent the preferences
if insider workers across diﬀerent European welfare regimes.
While trade unions have lost a signiﬁcant amount of social support and af-
ﬁliation, they have managed to preserve a strong inﬂuence, mainly, through
informal institutions. Most importantly, collective bargaining structures emerge
as a crucial factor, to explain why the power of insiders remains so prominent
today. It is through these bargaining tables that trade unions manage to, de
facto, inﬂuence fundamental policy decisions such as the way wage levels are
settled or the degree of ﬂexibility ﬁrms have to adapt working times to chang-
ing economic conditions. This ﬁnding is particularly relevant because the focus
in the literature is, essentially, on the political economy of formal institutions
such as EPL. A ﬁrst straightforward conclusion from this ﬁnding is that in order
to understand the reasons for the stickiness of two-tier labour markets, further
research should focus on the varieties of collective bargaining structures across
European welfare regimes  a good recent example of this research is Palier and
Thelen (2010).
Secondly, a signiﬁcant amount of the literature has focused on the inﬂu-
ence of insiders in deﬁning the policy agenda through social-democratic parties.
While this theory (ﬁrst proposed by Rueda (2005)) might still explain part of the
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divide  ie trade unions continue to have a strong political inﬂuence on social-
democratic parties  the increasing fragmentation of the electorate and the rise
of a large amount of new political parties and platforms would require, perhaps,
a revision of the theory. This review concentrates, however, on another, equally
relevant, issue that remains puzzling in the literature: do outsiders actually show
political preferences that are systematically diﬀerent than those of insiders?
The classic theory on the insider-outsider divide assumes that insiders and
outsiders have fundamentally opposing preferences (see Lindbeck and Snower
(1988), Saint-Paul and Rueda (2005)). While the former will actively defend
stronger employment protection, the latter will want to increase ﬂexibility in
order to have easier access to employment. In this review, however, I don't ﬁnd
conclusive evidence that supports this central assumption in the literature. If
that assumption does not hold, and the political preferences of insiders do not
actually diverge from those of outsiders, it would be absurd to expect outsiders to
organize themselves to ﬁght duality, thus becoming also agents of the status-quo.
Here, the contribution of Emmenegger (2012) opens new avenues of re-
search that remain largely unexplored, particularly as regards to the bounded-
rationality argument in his critique to the classic insider-outsider theory. Just
by opening any newspaper one can easily see his point. Journalists will prob-
ably blame globalization, technological change, or capitalism for the increasing
precariousness of the labour market, but it is very unlikely you will ﬁnd any
journalist pointing at the stringency of EPL of permanent workers as a cause of
the precariousness of the rest. Probably as a result of the immense complexity
of labour market regulations the insider-outsider divide has not been politicized.
And this, in turn, makes it more diﬃcult to reform.
As regards to the drivers of reforms that reduce the duality wedge, this paper
also adds two relevant contributions. First, I point to the economic cycle as a
key driver of reforms in EMU. While most of the existing literature focuses on
the politics of reform in the bad part of the cycle, I provide some evidence on
what happens to labour market reforms in periods of bonanza. What the data
shows is that over expansionary periods in EMU the rhythm of labour market
reforms drops abruptly and the insider-outsider wedge does not change. This
has a direct relevant implication for policy: in order to reduce social suﬀering,
a lot more focus should be posed on how to drive governments to reform during
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the expansionary part of the cycle, when there is ﬁscal space to compensate the
losers of reform.
I identify four periods of reform intensity in EMU. Over the decade that pre-
ceded the Euro, the EMU convergence criteria seem to have provided a strong
incentive for reforms. However, after entering the monetary union, the relaxation
of credit constraints made it easier for countries to get indebted, so necessary
labour market reforms were delayed and, in fact, in terms of reform activity
the wedge between insiders and outsiders did not change meaningfully. The
third period starts with the Great Recession whereby reform activity increases
abruptly. The key ﬁnding here is that the employment protection of insiders
decreased, while the protection of outsiders increased, meaning that the EMU
crisis contributed to reduce duality. Finally, with the beginning of the recovery
and the intervention of the ECB to ease credit constraints, the rhythm of re-
forms diminishes considerably again.
The second ﬁnding might open a relevant nuance for the study of the political
economy of reforms of dual labour markets in Europe: while there is no conclu-
sive evidence in the literature that crisis lead to duality reducing reforms, this
paper ﬁnds that the interaction between economic hardship and EMU surveil-
lance seems to be more eﬀective at reducing the insider-outsider divide. Fur-
ther research in this area would help to better understand how speciﬁc political
economy dynamics in EMU are associated with reform activity across welfare
regimes. Finally, domestic political factors also inﬂuence reform; case studies
show that eﬀective consultation and communication, preserving insiders rights or
compensation of losers of the reform help for successful duality-reducing reforms.
The paper is structured as follows: In the Section 2.2, I study the negative
eﬀects of duality on labour market outcomes and other economic variables, as
well as the existing policies proposed in the literature to reduce duality. In Sec-
tion 2.3, I provide a review of labour market institutions and how they interact
with the insider-outsider divide. In Section 2.4 I exploit data on labour market
reforms to study reforms in EMU over the last three decades and how these
reforms have aﬀected duality. In Section 2.5 I analyse the politics of the insider-
outsider divide, I review the classic insider-outsider theory and the criticisms to
the theory. In Section 2.6 I explore the drivers of duality reducing reforms. And
in Section 2.7 summarizes the main ﬁndings and Section 2.8 concludes.
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2.2 The negative eﬀects of duality
The economics literature on duality has focused on the eﬀects of two-tier sys-
tems on labour market outcomes and other economic variables. A signiﬁcant
amount of evidence shows that dual systems have strong negative eﬀects on
labour market outcomes. They show lower human capital formation by workers,
unequal opportunities for workers (particularly young workers), social exclusion,
excessive job rotation and higher unemployment.
Two-tier systems isolate permanent workers from the economic cycle, in-
creasing their bargaining power and decreasing the response of wages to unem-
ployment (Bentolila and Dolado, 1994). While insiders have become shielded
from economic shocks, outsiders act as a buﬀer, bearing the costs of economic
ﬂuctuations. In Spain, for instance, which stands out as an extreme case of
labour market duality, temporary contracts accounted for more than 90% of
new hires and above 25% of the total in 2016, while unemployment levels were
still above 20%. The new boom of temporary jobs in Spain is just the mirror
of the huge destruction of temporary jobs over crisis that preceded it: between
the ﬁrst quarter of 2008 and the second quarter of 2011, 60% of temporary jobs
were lost in net terms (650.000) Bentolila et al. (2012a).
Second, dual systems provide strong incentives for companies to dismiss
workers at the end of their temporary contract, leading to higher turnover levels
(Blanchard and Tirole, 2008). This is because ﬁrms prefer to substitute one
temporary worker by another, avoiding oﬀering much costlier permanent jobs.
This penalizes new entrants to the labour market, making it very diﬃcult for
young workers to access job stability. In this process, because of the invisi-
ble wall that protects certain workers over others, potentially better-prepared
workers are left out of the labour market. Cahuc et al. (2016), for instance,
show that strong legal constraints on the termination of permanent jobs have a
strong positive impact on the turnover of temporary jobs: the more stringent the
regulation for permanent jobs is, the lower the job stability faced by temporary
workers.
Third, because of the high turnover, companies tend to invest less in training
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temporary workers and this has a negative eﬀect on their human capital accumu-
lation and productivity. For instance, Cabrales et al. (2014), using micro data
from the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies
(PIAAC), document cross-country evidence on how the wedge in employment
protection between permanent and temporary workers is associated with a large
diﬀerential in on-the-job training, with the latter receiving considerably less
training. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007), based on ﬁrm-level data on Italy for the
period 1995-2000, ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms with a higher share of temporary
workers experienced lower growth in productivity.
Another way at looking at the abuse of temporary work (for non-temporary
activities, for instance) by certain ﬁrms is that they are taking advantage of
social security systems and taxpayers to ﬁnance a business strategy that should
not be supported by the public sector. When a worker loses his job, social ben-
eﬁts are automatically activated. When companies abuse temporary contracts
as part of their business strategy, they are taking advantage of social security
systems without having to internalize such cost.
Fourth, there are a number of other socio-economic consequences associated
with having a regulation that penalizes young workers in the labour market.
Job instability and precariousness are associated with postponing important life
decisions such as emancipating from the parents house or having children. Ac-
cording to Juan J. Dolado and Jimeno (2002), higher uncertainty with regards
to the duration of the contract is associated with lower mobility rates as well
as lower fertility rates. Spain, which in 2018 was the country with a higher
temporality rate in EMU, was also the country with the lowest fertility rate.
Fifth, a higher duality is also associated with higher unemployment levels.
Blanchard and Landier (2002), looking at the experience of France since the
early 1980s, argue that allowing ﬁrms to hire workers on ﬁxed-term contracts
leads to a higher turnover in entry-level jobs, resulting in higher, rather than
lower, unemployment. In a comparative study of France and Spain over the
Great Recession, Bentolila et al. (2012b) ﬁnd that unemployment grew much
more rapidly in Spain than in France over the crisis as a result of the gap (or
wedge) between the dismissal costs of workers with permanent and temporary
contracts, and the laxer rules on the use of temporary contracts in Spain than
in France. This is because the higher the gap, the lower the proportion of tem-
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porary jobs that are converted into permanent jobs, especially if restrictions of
the use of temporary jobs are de facto very limited, like in Spain. The authors
conclude that Spain could have avoided about 45% of its unemployment surge
had it adopted the French employment protection legislation (Bentolila et al.,
2012b, p. 155).
2.2.1 Varieties of insider-outsider regimes
The literature on Varieties of Capitalism introduces other interesting dimen-
sions to the debate on the negative eﬀects of the insider-outsider divide. Labour
markets have gone through a deep transformation over the last three decades.
The general trend has been to substitute traditional forms of work associated
with the industrial world (for-life jobs with high protection and high stability)
for an increasing segmentation of the labour market. The reasons for this struc-
tural change in labour markets are many; the increasing relevance of the service
sector, the increased labour force participation of women, technological trans-
formations, among others.
These developments have led to a boom in atypical work, increasing tempo-
rality, with a growing proportion of workers becoming outsiders. However, the
actual impact of this segmentation has not been homogenous across countries
and welfare regimes: while public policies in certain places have tended to mit-
igate the negative eﬀects of segmentation, in others they have contributed to
perpetuate the insider-outsider divides.
Häusermann (2012) study how these structural changes in labour markets
have actually translated into social divides and structural disadvantages for out-
siders in social, economic or political outcomes. The authors conclude that for
countries belonging to the Liberal regime type, segmentation is associated with
large income inequality, particularly aﬀecting low-skilled workers, and poor ac-
cess to training. However, these inequalities are reduced by the intervention of
the state. Regarding political access and participation, outsiders typically are
less active in elections than insiders.
Conversely, in Nordic countries, women are the most aﬀected by labour mar-
ket segmentation and, while there are signiﬁcant ex-ante income inequalities
between insiders and outsiders, these inequalities are largely corrected through
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taxes and transfers. Moreover, better policies regarding access to training and
promotion policies for outsiders reduce considerably the de facto penalization
of atypical workers. Remarkably, in terms of political participation (in elections
and trade unions), no diﬀerence is observed between outsiders and insiders.
In Continental European countries, gross income gaps between insiders and
outsiders are signiﬁcantly larger than in all other regimes - reaching a diﬀer-
ence of up to 30-40 percent - and access to training is also poorer for outsiders
than it is for insiders. Worryingly, the intervention of the welfare state in these
economies, according to the authors, tends to reinforce rather than reduce the
insider-outsider divide, for instance through the Pension systems in France and
Germany.
Finally, inequalities between insiders and outsiders in Southern European
countries tend to be smaller than in Continental European countries, although
the welfare state seems to be also ineﬃcient in correcting these inequalities.
Rather than decreasing, the divide between insiders and outsiders increases af-
ter taxes and transfers. This pro-insider institutional bias, according to the
authors, reﬂects the poor political integration of outsiders, who are much less
active in trade unions and participate less in elections than outsiders in other
welfare regimes.
For the purposes of this paper, the distributional eﬀects associated with the
insider-outsider divide in diﬀerent welfare regimes are very relevant. This is
because they might aﬀect the political behaviour of insiders and outsiders. In
the words of (Häusermann, 2012, p. 3):
if unemployment or atypical unemployment is not linked to concrete
disadvantage in terms of labour market power, welfare rights, or
political integration, the insider-outsider divide may well remain as
a purely sociological distinction without further political relevance
As we will see in 2.4, one of the main gaps identiﬁed in the classic insider-
outsider theory of employment and unemployment (Lindbeck and Snower (1988),
Saint-Paul (2000) and Rueda (2005)) is that the predicted rational preferences
and political behaviour of outsiders (i.e. that they will have divergent prefer-
ences as regards to insiders on employment protection legislation and that these
preferences will translate into diﬀerent political behaviour) are not observed in
the data in any systematic way. This might be one of the reasons why dual
52
labour markets are so hard to reform. For purposes of future research, it would
be of interest to strengthen the empirical evidence proposed by Häusermann
(2012) to evaluate whether the political preferences of outsiders do indeed vary
systematically across welfare regimes, and whether this is associated with the
eﬀective of the welfare state in correcting the insider-outsider divide.
2.2.2 Tackling duality
Reducing the ﬁring cost gap between temporary and permanent workers has
been on the European academic and policy agenda for a long time. The OECD
and the IMF have alerted on multiple occasions of the costs of rising duality.
Inﬂuential economic newspapers such as The Economist have denounced the
existence of the insider-outsider divide in the labour market as a two class
society (Insiders and Outsiders, 2006, October 26). The IMF, in their evalu-
ation of labour market policies over the Great Recession in Europe, argue that
dual employment protection, where high employment protection on permanent
contracts coexists with lighter regulation on temporary contracts, should be
avoided (Blanchard et al., 2014, p. 6).
The literature has proposed a number of diﬀerent ways to reduce the insider-
outsider divide. These include (1) reducing employment protection and the costs
for terminating open-ended contracts; (2) increasing the costs for terminating
ﬁx-term contracts; (3) the implementation of bonus-malus systems to promote
(or penalize) job stability (volatility) through lower (higher) social-security con-
tributions; (4) facilitating the conversion of ﬁx-term to permanent jobs through
diﬀerent types of subsides and (5) introducing a single open ended contract with
severance pay that is increasing with seniority (see Bertola (2014)).
So far, the success of most of these policies has proven to be very limited
and in some cases very costly. In Spain a number of measures have been im-
plemented to incentivize the conversion of temporary contracts into permanent
contracts, with very poor results. Given that these incentives were paid for all
conversions, companies that were anyway going to oﬀer a permanent position
received the subsidy. For instance, Garcia Perez and Rebollo Sanz (2009) evalu-
ate the eﬀectiveness of regional wage subsidies to foster permanent employment
and they ﬁnd that the outﬂow into permanent employment of eligible workers
improves only minimally.
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The so-called single contract has been in the policy agenda of a number of
European countries for years. Such a contract would imply the eﬀective elimi-
nation of all alternative contract types (with some exceptions) and as a result
would eliminate completely the wedge between temporary and permanent work-
ers, ending duality. Examples of proposals of a single contract for all workers
include Blanchard and Tirole (2004) for France, Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) for
Italy or FEDEA (2009) for Spain.
While there is still discrepancy as regards to the optimal design of the single
contract, existing proposals tend to agree on a model with increasing layoﬀ costs
over time. Such a design would provide the necessary ﬂexibility for all workers at
the beginning of their contracts, while eliminating, at the same time, the wedge
of protection at a certain threshold. This would eradicate the incentives of ﬁrms
to disregard workers driven by arbitrary regulatory reasons, thus improving the
eﬃciency of the system.
In terms of reforms, the implementation of the single contract has encoun-
tered strong legal and political diﬃculties. Renzi's Jobs Act has so far been
the most ambitious attempt of reducing duality through changes in the contract
system, with the introduction of a new open-ended contract with increasing pro-
tection over time, aimed at substituting the large variety of existing contracts
(see Sestito and Viviano (2016) for an in-depth analysis Renzi's Jobs Act and
its initial eﬀects on labour market outcomes).
In this section we have reviewed the negative eﬀects of dual labour markets
on a number of variables, as well as the policies to address them. We have
also seen that the political implications of the insider-outsider divide might be
mitigated by eﬀective welfare distribution, which, in turn, might vary across
welfare regimes. In the following section we study European labour market
institutions and how these relate to duality.
2.3 Labour Market Institutions in Europe
According to (Boeri, 2011, p. 1182) a labor market institution is a system of
laws, norms or conventions resulting from a collective choice, and providing con-
straints or incentives which alter individual choices over labor and pay. These
institutions include formal and informal regulations that determine a variety of
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rules and rights for workers and ﬁrms, such as diﬀerent contractual formulas,
minimum wages, or the beneﬁts mothers are entitled to while on maternity leave.
But labour market institutions also include more informal norms and arrange-
ments such as collective bargaining structures, which are often not written down
in laws. All these institutions end up aﬀecting in one way or another almost
everything in the economy: employment and unemployment levels, the wages
that workers take home, ﬁrms' revenues, the temporality rate, as well as the
opportunities young workers have to progress in their job.
For research purposes, the OECD (Tompson, 2009) classiﬁes labour market
institutions according to four categories: (1) Employment Protection Legisla-
tion (EPL), which refers to the regulations and costs associated with hiring
and dismissing workers (rules for the use of ﬁxed-term or part-time contracts,
ﬁring compensations, procedures for collective dismissals of workers, judicial
costs, etc); (2) Unemployment Beneﬁts (UB), which include cash transfers to
compensate for unemployment, redundancy payments and various measures to
support speciﬁc groups of workers; Active Labour Market Policies (ALMP),
which include training programmes, hiring subsidies for disadvantaged workers,
activation schemes, support and orientation in transition periods, etc. and (4)
the Tax Wedge which the OECD deﬁnes as the ratio between the amount of
taxes paid by an average single worker without children and the corresponding
total labour cost for the employer.
Naturally, diﬀerent combinations of these institutions, translate into very
diﬀerent labour market results. Political scientists - in particular the literature
on Varieties of Capitalism - have identiﬁed four types of labour market regimes
in Europe: (1) the Liberal or Anglo-Saxon model, which is associated with
low unemployment, short employment duration, low EPL and low UB; (2) the
Nordic model, which is also associated with low unemployment, medium EPL
and high UB, combined with conditionality and strong active labour market
policies, (3) the continental model, with medium unemployment, high EPL,
generous UB and poor ALMP that limit reallocation and (4) the Southern
model with high unemployment, generous UB and poor ALMP (see Thelen
(2001), for instance, for a good summary of the literature on Varieties of Capi-
talism and labour markets as well as for diﬀerent typologies).
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2.3.1 Collective Bargaining Structures and duality
Besides the existing formal institutions analysed in the previous section, there
are other relevant informal institutions that matter for the study of the polit-
ical economy of dual labour markets, most importantly bargaining structures.
It is through collective bargaining negotiations that wages are determined and
hence, the outcomes of these negotiations directly aﬀect the insider-outsider di-
vide. Furthermore, depending at the level at which these negotiations take place,
the agreements achieved also determine the internal ﬂexibility that ﬁrms enjoy to
adapt to the cycle, for instance, by adjusting the working time of their workers.
This, in turn, might have a strong eﬀect on the insider-outsider wedge: if the
agreements on ﬂexibility are very stringent, outsiders will pay the consequences
by losing their jobs. Moreover, social partners (trade unions and business asso-
ciations) also play a key role in labour market reform consultations and in many
cases they are crucial partners for a reform to succeed (see for instance Sestito
and Viviano (2016)).
Collective bargaining structures vary across countries. Some countries have
nationally centralized systems and others determine wages at industry or plant-
level negotiations. Other countries have two-tier systems in which multi-employer
wage agreements (at regional, industry or country level) coexist with ﬁrm-level
negotiations over many issues, including pay levels or work-time ﬂexibility (see
for instance Boeri (2015)).
Given that trade unions and employer organizations are responsible for es-
tablishing the way these bargaining structures work as well as in deﬁning wage-
setting negotiations, the interests they represent are crucial to understand the
outcomes of these negotiations. Data shows that workers with permanent jobs
(insiders) are strongly over-represented and, although collective bargaining struc-
tures vary across countries, the same patterns of representation are reproduced
in most European countries (see for instance Checchi and Lucifora (2002)).
In a study on the insider-outsider divides in Spain (Dolado et al., 2010) ﬁnd
that 85% of the workers aﬃliated to unions are on permanent contracts. They
also observe that aﬃliation is strongly biased in age and gender. Women and
young workers are underrepresented. Moreover, public sector workers are much
more likely to be aﬃliated to a trade union than workers in the private sector.
Also, workers in large-companies and workers that have been a long time in the
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ﬁrm tend to be over-represented. Remarkably, the authors also ﬁnd that in the
ﬁrst two years of the Spanish economic recession (between 2007-2009), 99.3% of
the employment destroyed was among workers that had no trade union aﬃlia-
tion, a large majority of them on temporary contracts (with signiﬁcantly lower
dismissal costs) (Dolado et al., 2010).
It is precisely in periods of crisis, when collective bargaining institutions
matter the most, because ﬁrms need to be able to adapt quickly to the eco-
nomic cycle. In strongly dualized economies with low protection for temporary
workers, insiders tend to be shielded from macro-economic shocks and outsiders
work as a buﬀer for the adjustment. Existing legal limitations to adjust wages
in some European countries and resistance by permanent workers - the workers
sitting at the bargaining tables - to adapt their conditions normally means that
ﬁrms have to adjust the quantity of work (rather than the price of it). Since it
takes time until insiders feel threatened (see Section 2.5 on the drivers of duality
reducing refoms) pay-levels do not adjust quickly to economic and productivity
variations, and outsiders pay the consequences.
The role of employer organizations in collective bargaining structures also
matters for the insider-outsider divide. Given that large companies usually con-
trol these organizations, wage-setting negotiations are used instrumentally to
reduce wage competition from smaller companies (Boeri, 2015). Small compa-
nies (SMEs) are largely absent from collective bargaining structures (they are
underrepresented both in terms of workers in unions and as ﬁrms in employ-
ment organizations) and this hinder their competitiveness vis-à-vis big compa-
nies while limiting their capacity to grow.
According to Palier and Thelen (2010), collective bargaining structures are
the most important institution driving the persistence of duality. The authors
analyse the evolution of collective bargaining and industrial relations over re-
cent decades, and conclude that in both countries the structures put in place in
the 1970s and early 1980s to enhance labour's voice at the plant level ironically
provided ideal vehicles for fuelling trends toward dualism when economic hard
times hit (Palier and Thelen, 2010, p. 126). This is because, they argue, it
is through collective bargaining structures that trade unions have managed to
successfully preserve protection for core workers, while accepting increased ﬂex-
ibility for other types of jobs. This, as we will see in Section 2.4 on the theory
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of the insider-outsider divide, goes against one of the central arguments put for-
ward in the literature: Rueda (2005)'s view that social-democratic parties, and
not collective bargaining structures, are the main responsible for the rise of dual
labour market structures.
One of the key collective bargaining mechanisms that has allowed trade
unions to preserve their inﬂuence is the automatic extension to all workers in
the economy of agreements achieved at country (industry or regional) level. In
France this is called the procedure d'extension  a legal device by which secto-
rial or national agreements are extended to all companies in the industry or the
country, even if only a minority of unions and business associations has sup-
ported them.
These automatic extensions function in the same way as they did 30 years
ago, despite the fact that aﬃliation to trade unions has fallen, persistently, in
recent decades. Germany's aﬃliation rate today has gone below 25 percent,
while in the 70s it peaked at 35 percent. In Spain, while only about 13 percent
of workers are aﬃliated to a trade union, these still determine working condi-
tions for more than 90 percent of workers. In France, organization rates have
fallen below 10 percent in recent years, although in the 60s they were close to
20 percent. It is important to note that norms like the procedure d'extension
have allowed trade unions to preserve a large amount of power, consolidating
insiders' interests in detriment of outsiders, despite loosing huge social support.
It goes beyond the scope of this paper to try to understand why diﬀerent com-
binations of these institutions exist in the ﬁrst place in diﬀerent countries. But
the fact that these institutions have deep historical roots and are culturally and
socially embedded in societies, might be one of the reasons why well-designed
formal institutional reforms are not easy to implement or transplant from one
place to another (Blanchard et al., 2014).
Informal institutions and civic attitudes, such as the level of trust between
ﬁrms and workers have a large explanatory power in cross-country evidence on
levels of absenteeism and the extent to which workers abuse the unemployment
beneﬁt system. Conversely, higher trust might help to improve dialogue between
social partners and to reach shared commitments (Blanchard et al., 2014, p. 5).
Moreover, civic attitudes tend to be very sticky, meaning that they might be
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an invisible constraint for successful reforms in certain European countries. For
instance, as Agell (1999) argues, persistent social norms are an independent
and important cause of wage rigidity (. . . ) and when these norms are a binding
constraint on behaviour, legal reform may accomplish very little. All in all,
the relevance of other informal labour market institutions and their impact on
labour market outcomes deserves further exploration.
Regarding the political and historical origins of duality speciﬁcally, the lit-
erature is not very extensive either. Rueda et al. (2015) provides perhaps the
most ambitious explanation, by linking the economic policy decisions in the af-
termath of World War II, to the emergence of labour market regulations, and
the extent of labour market dualism today. He argues that policies developed
with an eye toward internally-oriented industrialization (ISI) left a powerful im-
print on labour market regulations aimed at protecting labour market insiders
(Rueda et al., 2015, p. 3). On the other hand, Rueda et al. (2015) argue that,
consistent with the need to respond to dynamic market signals, the most open
and externally oriented economies in the 1960s, like the Scandinavian countries,
promoted rather low levels of employment protection combined with high levels
of social compensation.
2.4 Labour market reforms in Europe
An analysis of the number and characteristics of labour market reforms in Eu-
rope points to some interesting facts. As regards to the number of reforms
between 1980 and 2014, European countries implemented an average of almost
two reforms per year per country (460 for seven selected countries of the Euro-
zone, according to Boeri (2011)).
Since the 1990s, four diﬀerent periods can be identiﬁed. The ﬁrst is the
decade that goes from 1990 to 1999 whereby reform activity increases in most
Continental and Southern countries in all policy areas, presumably to meet
the core EMU convergence criteria. Over this period the economies that had
committed to enter the Euro went into the Exchange Rate Mechanism, which
forced them to stabilize their nominal exchange rates. Moreover, the Maastricht
Treaty, signed in 1991, established ambitious targets on debt, deﬁcits and inﬂa-
tion. These factors left little space, particularly for the more backward Southern
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European economies, to avoid necessary reform (see Hancké and Rhodes (2005)).
The second period goes from 1999 to 2007 in which most countries reduce
reform activity, probably as a result of the relaxation of constraints, particularly
in the South, presumably as a result from the massive ﬂow of cheap credit (see
Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013)). The third period goes from 2007 to 2012,
the harshest years of the ﬁnancial and debt crisis. Over these years reform ac-
tivity increases abruptly, and it concentrates in the Southern economies. The
fourth period, which goes from 2012 until today, shows again a moderation in
the number of reforms. One possible explanation for that could be the return
to growth and, generally lower external constraints, with bailout programmes
ending and the ECB intervening as a lender of last resort for these economies,
relaxing monetary conditions.
In what follows I will be analysing the Labour Market Reforms Database
(LABREF) compiled by the European Commission, which covers all labour mar-
ket reforms and relevant collective agreements and tripartite agreements enacted
and implemented in Europe from 2000 to 2016. Reforms and agreements are
classiﬁed into nine diﬀerent policy domains, covering labour taxation, unemploy-
ment beneﬁts, other welfare-related beneﬁts, active labour market policies, job
protection legislation, disability and early retirement schemes, wage bargaining,
working time organisation, immigration and mobility. For each measure, it also
identiﬁes the policy ﬁeld. For instance, in the domain of unemployment bene-
ﬁts, it identiﬁes whether the measure aﬀected coverage and eligibility conditions,
duration, the net replacement rate or search and job availability requirements.
It also identiﬁes the direction (increasing or decreasing) of the policy measure,
which diﬀers depending on the policy area. For instance, an increasing reform
in unemployment beneﬁts would be interpreted as increasing the generosity of
unemployment beneﬁts and relaxing the job search and availability requirements.
In job protection legislation, an increasing reform measure would mean that it
increases the level of protection against job dismissals or severance pay. Interest-
ingly, the database also identiﬁes the population that is aﬀected by the reform,
i.e. whether it just concerns new entrants, incumbents, or both, and whether
it aﬀects temporary workers or permanent workers. The number of reforms
recorded in this database is very large, because one single legistative initiative
might aﬀect several policy domains, and/or diﬀerent types of individuals, and
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will therefore be recorded more than once.1 The aim of this analysis is to see
trends over time in reform activity that aﬀects labour market duality.
Figure 2.1 below shows the average number of labour market reforms per
country in the South of Europe (Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain)
and in what I denote the Core countries (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France,
Germany, Luxembourg, Netherlands) between 2000 and 2016. The rhythm of
reforms is almost ﬂat until the start of the Great Recession in 2007, when re-
form activity increases across the board, and especially for those countries more
severely aﬀected by the ﬁnancial and sovereign debt crisis (South). The average
number of reforms in Southern countries rises from around 11 in 2007 to 33
reforms in 2012, while Core countries introduced on average about 9 reforms in
2007, and 14 in 2012. After the announcement of the European Central Bank
(ECB) to do whatever it takes to stabilize ﬁnancial markets, reform activity
drops sharply in the South, while it remains at a level higher than that prior to
the crisis for Core countries.
Naturally, the rhythm of reforms has varied over time, among countries as
well as policy areas. According to the analysis of Alessandro Turrini (2014) using
the LABREF database, reforms have been more frequent in active labour market
policies (ALMP) and labour taxation than in employment protection legislation
(EPL). However, the reform patterns have not been homogenous across country
groups. While core countries have focused more on reforming ALMPs, South-
ern countries show a higher frequency of reform activity in EPL, particularly
towards the end of the decade.
Countries have, indeed, carried out reforms, although not always in a direc-
tion that increased eﬃciency or improved equity. For the purposes of this paper
what matters is whether reforms contributed or not to reduce duality (ie the
insider-outsider wedge). One way at looking at this is by analysing the direc-
tion of reforms. That is, for instance, whether reforms decrease (increase) EPL
protection or reduce (augment) the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts and so
on.
Over the whole period analysed, the LABREF data indicates that European
countries follow a common trend towards strengthening ALMPs. As regards to
1For a more detailed description of the database, see Alessandro Turrini (2014).
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Figure 2.1: Average Number of Labour Market Reforms undertaken by coun-
tries in Core and South of Europe
Source: Based on LABREF data. Notes: The graph shows the average number of
labour market reforms undertaken per country per year, for diﬀerent country groups.
The numbers are derived by summing up the total number of all labour market reforms
undertaken in each country of each group and dividing by the number of countries
in the group. Core countries include Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany,
Luxembourg, Netherlands. South includes Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain.
EPL, which is the most relevant area aﬀecting the insider-outsider divide, an
increased frequency of reforms addressing the EPL regime for permanent work-
ers is observed after 2006. Two periods can be easily identiﬁed. Over the short
decade that preceded the crisis the data does not show a clear direction towards
increasing or decreasing EPL protection (or reducing the wedge) between per-
manent and temporary workers. In fact, EMU countries implemented a similar
amount of reforms in both directions: increasing and decreasing the protection
of permanent and temporary workers (taken here as a proxy for insiders and
outsiders).
Figure 2.2 shows the total number of reforms undertaken in EPL, divided by
whether they were targeted at temporary or permanent workers, and whether
they increased or decreased EPL for these workers. We see the following pattern:
in the period prior to the crisis (2000-2007), about the same overall number of
reforms were targeted at temporary workers (38) and permanent workers (46),
and the proportion of reforms that increased EPL and those that decreased EPL
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was very similar for both temporary (66% vs 33%) and permanent workers (63%
vs 37%).
Since the onset of the crisis, the number of EPL reforms has increased sub-
stantially for both permanent and temporary workers, but much more so for
the former (to 149 for the former and 110 for the latter). Moreover, permanent
workers were much more frequently the target of EPL-decreasing reforms (60%)
than EPL-increasing reforms (40%) in the period since the crisis, while tem-
porary workers faced a much larger number and proportion of EPL-increasing
reforms (60%) than EPL-decreasing reforms (40%). This means that in the pe-
riod after the crisis, the pattern of reforms can be regarded as decreasing duality,
driven by a relatively stronger reduction in the protection of permanent workers,
and a relatively faster increase in protection of temporary workers.
Figure 2.2: Total Number of Employment Protection Legislation Reforms un-
dertaken by countries in Europe targeted at temporary and permanent workers
in the pre- and post-crisis period
Source: Based on LABREF data. Notes: EPL decreasing reforms are reforms that
resulted in a reduction of employment protection, while those that are deﬁned as
increasing made employment protection more stringent.
As shown in the following Section, this data coincides with the predictions
in the literature on the political economy of reforms in dual systems: it is only
when insiders feel threatened by high and rising unemployment, that reforms
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to reduce EPL protection for permanent workers (and hence reduce duality)
are possible (see for instance Saint-Paul (2000) and Juan J. Dolado and Jimeno
(2002)). The fact that EPL for temporary workers does increase over the crisis
period, as can be observed in the graph, might reﬂect a gradual adjustment from
previous reforms reducing their protection and increasing segmentation.
A similar pattern is observed when looking at the FRdB database. Accord-
ing to Boeri (2011): a majority of reforms of employment protection from 1980
to 2007 focus only in the ﬂexible tier of the labour market and, hence, increase
dualism in European labour markets. This reinforces one important argument
predicted by the theory: it is during periods of crisis, when unemployment is
high and growing, that reforms altering the protection of insiders, are more likely.
In relation to the crisis, Alessandro Turrini (2014) identify two diﬀerent pe-
riods of reform activity. At the beginning of the crisis (the 2008-2009) European
countries implemented reforms focused on cushioning the impact of an economic
recession that was perceived to be temporary. These reforms were focused on
expanding the social safety net and, broadly, increasing protection for all work-
ers: mainly through more generous unemployment beneﬁts and more investment
in active labour market policies. However, this pattern changed in the period
2010-11. As the crisis continued, debt increased, demand contracted and credit
conditions tightened, the composition of reforms changed in order to improve the
adjustment capacity of labour markets. In this period, reforms were primarily
targeted at employment protection, wage setting and working time. Moreover,
as the ﬁscal space became tighter, the initial measures aimed at mitigating the
impact of the recession, started to fade away.
Overall, these stylized facts point to two conclusions. The ﬁrst is that in peri-
ods of bonanza, countries in Europe do not seem to implement duality-reducing
reforms, but rather prefer to focus on the (politically more viable) reforms in
the margin, aﬀecting only a segment of the labour market or temporary workers.
However, this pattern changes in periods of crisis, whereby insiders do seem to
lose some degree of protection vis-à-vis outsiders. In Section 2.6 we explore in
more depth the interaction between crisis and reforms as well as the importance
of speciﬁc EMU political economy dynamics that might facilitate the reduction
of duality.
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To conclude, most of the literature on labour market institutions and reforms
in Europe focuses on the eﬀects of labour market reforms on other economic vari-
ables, based on cross-country comparisons or using diﬀerence-in-diﬀerence tech-
niques to exploit regulatory variations. Both these literatures are well reviewed
in Boeri (2011). However, much less attention has been paid, to the drivers of
labour market reform, or lack thereof, which is the focus of the following section.
2.5 The politics of labour market institutions
As we have seen in previous sections, there is a large variety of labour market
institutions and diﬀerent institutional regimes in Europe. However we have not
addressed crucial questions for the purposes of this paper: what are the power
conﬁgurations that lead to these diﬀerent institutions in the ﬁrst place? What
are the political reasons behind the persistence of duality? In this section, I
review the literature on the political economy of the insider-outsider divide, the
classic economist view, as well as the main criticisms to the theory.
State interventions in labour markets are necessary, as markets often lead
to socially undesirable results. For instance, market forces do a poor job in
protecting workers against unemployment risks, requiring the public provision
of unemployment protection. Similarly, the equilibrium wages determined by
supply and demand of work in the economy might be too low to guarantee
minimum living conditions for workers, thus requiring the implementation of
minimum wage regulations. In the same way, given technological change, gov-
ernments might decide that investment in skills, through active labour market
policies, is needed to keep up with those changes.
Decisions by governments to intervene in the labour market have strong dis-
tributional implications that need to be taken into account, as they lead to
very diﬀerent labour market outcomes. Standard economic theory holds that
a stringent employment protection legislation, which limits the employers' abil-
ity to adapt the work force to changing economic conditions, is associated with
higher unemployment levels and longer unemployment spells. Similarly, high
unemployment beneﬁts, because they increase the reservation wage, might pro-
vide disincentives to work. Also, low investment in active labour market policies
(ALMP) is associated with longer unemployment duration and ineﬃcient spend-
ing (Bertola, 2014). The same idea applies to dual labour markets: segmented
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labour markets and high temporality rates translate into lower human-capital
formation, less opportunities for the young and even higher unemployment, as
we have seen in Section 2.2. However, if we know that some of these institutions
are ineﬃcient and lead to inequitable outcomes, why are these seemingly bad
institutions so persistent over time?
Diﬀerent institutional settings are not (only) the result of automatic pub-
lic interventions to correct microeconomic frictions and market imperfections.
They are the reﬂection of a political process; whereby diﬀerent interest groups
determine a speciﬁc political economy setting that favours some more powerful
groups over others (Saint-Paul, 1993). From a political economy perspective, in-
stitutional equilibriums must be beneﬁcial to, at least, some powerful groups in
the labour market, so that they can be politically sustained over time. In other
words, there may be some distributional dimensions of the rents that result from
diﬀerent institutional arrangements, which create enough winners that work in
favour of reinforcing the status quo.
The concept of rent applied to the labour market is a central concept in the
work of Saint-Paul (1993, 2000), who is one of the most relevant contributors
to the political economy of labour market institutions. Rents, according to
Saint-Paul, are the welfare diﬀerence between being employed and unemployed,
and thus they reﬂect an equilibrium between insiders and outsiders. Reducing
the wedge of employment protection between insiders and outsiders might be
good for employment and improve the fairness of the system, but it is not easy to
achieve, precisely because it reﬂects a speciﬁc power relationship (see Saint-Paul
(2000)).
2.5.1 The classic insider-outsider theory
Lindbeck and Snower (1988) were the ﬁrst economists to formalize a theory of
employment and unemployment based on the insider-outsider divide. Their ini-
tial goal was to address a puzzle that became evident after the ﬁrst oil shocks
in the seventies: the rapid de-industrialization in most advanced economies
translated into lower productivity growth and unemployment rose spectacularly.
However, wage setters did not seem to adjust to the new reality of lower produc-
tivity growth (Blanchard, 2005, p. 19). Salaries were not responding to market
signals, as the theory would predict, so other forces, beyond the pure market
incentives, had to be playing a role.
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Lindbeck and Snower (1988) analysed the way wages were settled in collec-
tive bargaining institutions and were the ﬁrst to argue that in wage negotiations
carried out by trade unions and employer organizations (see Section 2.3), the
interests of outsiders were not being represented. On the contrary, the authors
argued, employed workers (i.e. the insiders) defended their own strategic inter-
ests, which involved setting higher wages for themselves or implementing more
stringent employment regulation to avoid being ﬁred. Employers on permanent
contracts were legitimately defending their interests, but at the same time they
were hurting the interests of temporary workers and the unemployed. If wages
did not adjust in the bargaining tables in periods of high unemployment, em-
ployers would have no other option but to stop hiring unemployed workers and
start dismissing (cheaper) temporary workers. By maximizing their interest in
wage negotiations, insiders were raising the entry barriers for outsiders (Saint-
Paul, 2004). The result was that unemployment remained above the theoretical
natural rate, and this was a direct result of a purely political equilibrium re-
ﬂected in the imbalance of representation of insiders and outsiders in the wage
bargaining process.
According to the economist view, insiders and outsiders have opposing in-
terests and are, naturally, assumed to behave rationally. While outsiders should
ﬁght to reduce rigidities so to have an easier access to employment and job
stability, insiders should insure labour-turnover remains low by increasing em-
ployment protection for workers with a permanent contract. Naturally, this
will reduce the chances of the unemployed and temporary workers to access job
security. Also, given that insiders are much less vulnerable than outsiders to
unemployment, they will be less inclined to support spending in employment
promotion or higher beneﬁts for the unemployed.
The power of insiders, according to Lindbeck and Snower (2001) is a function
of labour turnover costs. Turnover costs are, mainly, the costs of hiring, ﬁring
and training. The higher these are, the higher will be the entry barrier for out-
siders and the lower the incentives for the ﬁrm to replace insiders with outsiders.
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2.5.2 The political economy of employment protection leg-
islation
As we have seen in Section 2.2, EPL includes severance payments to workers,
direct payments to the state, and administrative and judicial costs. Typically,
these regulations have the goal of protecting existing jobs because they are aimed
at reducing job destruction. So, EPL has, naturally, a strong political support
and has an easy sell: nobody likes unemployment.
The actual implications for the labour market are, however, often perverse.
By increasing dismissal costs, EPL reduces job creation as it becomes less prof-
itable for businesses to hire and for entrepreneurs to create new ﬁrms. The
eﬀect of EPL on unemployment in theory as in practice is ambiguous: while by
decreasing job destruction it lowers unemployment, by reducing job creation it
increases unemployment. One clear eﬀect of EPL is its negative impact on pro-
ductivity: by altering the process of job creation and job destruction, it changes
the nature of unemployment, increasing, for instance, the average duration of
unemployment (Blanchard and Tirole, 2004).
In the words of (Saint-Paul, 1993, p. 152), EPL is diﬃcult to reform: while
jobs destroyed are very visible for society, jobs not created are not. Organizing
political coalitions to defend the rights of those that already have a job is much
easier than defending those that could potentially have a job (or a better one) if
the regulation were to be changed. Moreover, given that the unemployed are
a minority, political decisions are likely to reﬂect the interests of the employed
rather than the unemployed.
The insider-outsider distinction also provides insights on a number of other
divides, most importantly, skilled versus non-skilled workers. According to the
economist view, political support for labour market rigidities such as EPL comes
mainly from employed workers on permanent contracts. However, unskilled em-
ployed workers are likely to be the most active in defence of duality, given that
they enjoy a higher wage than they would in equilibrium (they are beneﬁtting
from an artiﬁcial rent). Conversely, the unskilled unemployed would be the
strongest coalition against EPL, given that EPL increases the fraction of time
they expect to be in unemploymentLindbeck and Snower (2001). In addition,
the labour market for high-skill workers is (assumed to be) in equilibrium with
wages that adjust to oﬀset demand and supply imbalances. High-skilled workers
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(both insiders and outsiders) are, generally, assumed to be in favour of lower
EPL because they are likely to have to, indirectly, assume the burden (in terms
of higher taxes) of higher unemployment levels induced by stringent EPL. Saint-
Paul (2000) predicts that as long as the unskilled employed are more numerous,
more cohesive and have a stronger political inﬂuence than the coalition of the
skilled and the unskilled unemployed, support for high levels of EPL will persist.
Similarly to Saint-Paul (2000), Boeri et al. (2012) characterise EPL and Un-
employment Beneﬁts as schemes not only redistributing between insiders and
outsiders, but also across skill groups. They suggest that ﬂexicurity conﬁgu-
rations characterized by less segmentation, lower job protection, more training
and more support to the unemployed should emerge in countries with a larger
fraction of the population being skilled. Given the two arguments above, a plau-
sible explanation for the persistence of duality is low investment in education.
It is precisely because of the diﬃculty of reforming EPL of permanent workers
that governments started engineering two-tier reforms as a device to overcome
political resistance. The introduction of temporary contracts is a way of re-
ducing employment protection without running into the opposition of workers
already protected. Fixed-term contracts do not reduce in any way the rights or
bargaining power of the already employed, while they, theoretically, provide an
improvement in labour market participation for the unemployed.
2.5.3 The problems with the economist view: outsiders,
unions and parties
A central assumption in what we have called the economists view is that the
interests of insiders and outsiders are fundamentally opposed. While the for-
mer care mainly about preserving their job security, the latter care about job
precariousness and unemployment, hence standing always for lower employment
protection. According to the economist view these opposing interests translate,
almost mechanically, into political preferences and party behaviour. That is,
(low-skilled) insiders and outsiders will organize themselves to defend their in-
terests and vote accordingly, as two homogenous and clearly separated political
blocks.
Almost by deﬁnition, the political inﬂuence of insiders in designing the pol-
icy agenda will outweigh that of the outsiders. This inﬂuence will work through
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two theoretical mechanisms. The ﬁrst assumption is that insiders control trade-
union strategies. And, given that trade unions are instrumental in determin-
ing labour market relations (through collective bargaining structures, political
parties and participation in reform processes), they will ensure their strategic
interests are defended (against those of the outsiders). The second assumption
is that the insider/outsider division will determine voting behaviour and party
strategies. As we will see in the following section, according to the economist
view, insiders will naturally support social-democratic parties (Rueda, 2005).
And social-democratic parties will choose to defend insiders' interests (against
those of outsiders) because the former represent a majority of the voting base
and are politically more engaged.
While the ﬁrst assumption is broadly accepted in the literature  insiders
do control trade unions, as we have seen -, the political preferences and ra-
tional behaviour that the classic insider-outsider theory attributes to outsiders
are contested in the political science literature. In fact, there is no conclu-
sive evidence that outsiders vote systematically diﬀerently than insiders. Which
leads to another, more structural, criticism to the classic economic theory on
the insider/outsider divide, ﬁrst pointed out by Emmenegger (2009): there is no
conclusive evidence that outsiders are even aware of their condition as outsiders.
As a result, it is unlikely they will organize themselves to defend their interests.
If this argument is true, and outsiders' political preferences do not diverge from
those of insiders, for the purposes of this paper, it would be absurd to expect
them to be actively defending reforms to reduce duality, thus becoming also
agents of the status quo. Clearly, the most important gap in the literature I
have identiﬁed is as regards to empirical support for the assumptions taken on
the political behaviour of outsiders. In fact, according to the existing evidence,
there is no reason to believe that outsiders will have any diﬀerent interest than,
actually, becoming insiders.
One would expect that further research should focus on how bounded ra-
tionality might play a key role here. Even when looking at newspapers, one
becomes easily aware of the limited understanding (even among economic jour-
nalists) of how the basic functioning of the labour market works. Expecting
outsiders to understand the tremendous complexities of labour market regula-
tions and their impact on their job situation is probably, simply, to ambitious.
For instance, the very understanding that the employment protection of some
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workers (insiders) might be associated to job precariousness of other workers
(outsiders) is far from trivial.
In the following section I address the ﬁrst (correct) assumption of the economist
view on the insider-outsider divide: the role of the unions.
2.5.4 Unions as the vanguard of duality
Market liberalisation and the decline of manufacturing and heavy industry not
only undermined the traditional base of trade unionism. They went also accom-
panied by a fast increase in temporary work that did not feel represented by the
unions. The expansion of the services sector and the appearance of new pro-
fessions (goods delivery, elderly care and so on) also translated into new forms
of non-standard work, new types of contracts and more precarious working
conditions for a large number of workers.
However, these changes did not alter the composition, or the behaviour of
trade unions. It is widely accepted among economists, political scientists and
sociologists that unions have not been able to integrate the interests of out-
siders (see for instance Kalleberg (2009)). Hall (1987), for example (already in
the 80s!) notes how increasing ﬂexibility intensiﬁed the cross-cutting pressures
that unions already feel between the demands of their core constituency, who
are employed, and the broader penumbra of the working class that is under
or unemployed (Hall (1987), cited in (Richards and Polavieja, 1997, p. 10)).
Although trade unions have managed to isolate eﬀectively their core workers
throughout the on-going changes in the labour market, pressures to accept in-
creasing ﬂexibility for other types of jobs have intensiﬁed.
Moreover, the spaces of work socialisation have changed dramatically with
the new forms of work. This makes it more diﬃcult for workers to organise, like
they used to, around factories or industrial centres. The lack of work social-
isation (and organisation) is particularly acute for temporary workers. Using
data for Spain, Richards and Polavieja (1997) argue that workers on temporary
contracts or unemployed do not get involved in pro-union behaviour.
Writing about the Spanish case, Dolado et al. (2010) argue that trade unions
(through collective bargaining structures and their inﬂuence in social-democratic
parties) have been the ﬁrst line of defence of the Spanish extreme dual system.
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In fact, by analysing reforms in the Spanish labour market over the last 20 years,
they show that the evolution of the relative strength of insiders is closely associ-
ated with the probability of labour market reforms, with the latter falling when
the former rises.
This is mainly because the typical worker represented in a Spanish union
is not representative of the working population. In fact, the median voter of
a Spanish trade union - needed to insure internal re-election in the union - co-
incides with the typical worker (with a permanent contract, typically working
at a large ﬁrm, low-skilled and strongly protected) that would lose the most
from a reform that reduces employment protection legislation. As we saw in
Section 2.3, given that trade unions (despite having lost a large amount of social
support) still preserve a strong inﬂuence across Europe in designing labour mar-
ket reforms and in determining nation-wide wage levels and working conditions,
their power in preserving large insider-outsider divides remains very strong.
In their study of the developments of industrial and collective bargaining
structures over the last decades in France and Germany, Palier and Thelen (2010)
see a similar on-going trend in these continental economies. They conclude that:
Labor market reforms have generally promoted developments in
which the status and privileges of labor market insiders remain rel-
atively well protected, with the ﬂexibility necessary to stabilize the
core being achieved at the expense of a growing number of workers in
atypical or nonstandard employment relationships. (Palier and
Thelen, 2010, p. 139)
The authors also point to another relevant issue: the trend towards dual-
ization is also aﬀecting welfare reforms and protection. Increasingly, a stronger
divide exists between traditional contributory beneﬁts for workers on permanent
contracts and new forms of limited assistance through in work non-contributory
beneﬁts for outsiders (Palier and Thelen, 2010).
In their analysis of the latest Italian labour market reforms, Sestito and Vi-
viano (2016) also see trade unions as playing a central role in preserving duality.
Nonetheless, they also see the Great Recession as playing a central role in driving
duality-reducing reforms. They argue that the two attempts to reduce dismissal
costs for permanent workers by the D'Alema and Berlusconi administrations
were frustrated by the opposition from the largest union, the CGIL. However,
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the Fornero reform (2012), named after Elena Fornero, the Employment Minis-
ter under Monti's government, did reduce severance costs of permanent workers
(mainly by reducing judicial uncertainty). The unwillingness of trade unions
to reduce the stringency of EPL for permanent workers was overcome, the au-
thors argue, by a combination of a technocratic government (by deﬁnition, less
responsive to insiders' pressures) and strong external constraints at the peak of
Italy's vulnerability in the Eurozone crisis (Sestito and Viviano, 2016).
The Jobs Act, introduced in 2014 by Renzi's government, has so far been
the most ambitious attempt to ﬁght duality in Europe. The reform introduced
measures to reduce ﬁring costs and uncertainty for ﬁrms above 15 employees by
limiting the inﬂuence of judges in ﬁring decisions, and the risks of reinstatement,
as well as a very generous non-conditional hiring subsidy for companies hiring
permanent workers, among other measures. Sestito and Viviano (2016) argue
that the government gave up 'the idea of obtaining union's consent and that this
was the key factor facilitating reform.
Given the above, the fact that temporary workers barely participate in
unions, should be an important factor explaining the persistence of duality.
However, why are outsiders not building alternative forms of inﬂuence and rep-
resentation to defend their interests? In the following section we explore the
relationship between dualization and party strategies.
2.5.5 Dualization and Party Strategies
One of the central arguments in the political science literature on insider-outsider
politics refers to the relationship between party strategies and the insider-outsider
divide. This is particularly important for the purposes of this paper, given that
political parties  after all, the suppliers of policy and reforms- are likely to play
a key role in explaining why duality is so persistent.
The seminal work by (Rueda, 2005) provides the classic political framework
of the economist view, explaining how insider-outsider politics might map into
voting and party behaviour. The theory argues that while traditional social-
democratic parties used to defend the interests of the working class as a whole,
this is not true anymore. Increasing labour market segmentation over the years,
the rise of the so-called atypical employment, and the emergence of the insider-
outsider divide have transformed party strategies over time and this has become
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a crucial factor explaining the stickiness of duality.
Looking at Eurobarometer data and annual macro data from 16 OECD coun-
tries from 1973 to 1995, Rueda (2005) shows that social-democratic parties have
abandoned the goal of providing equality and security to the most vulnerable
sectors of the labour market (i.e. the outsiders). Given that the working class
is not anymore a homogenous block, social-democratic parties had to choose
between serving the interests of those with stable jobs (the insiders) and those
in precarious work or unemployed (the outsiders). Rueda concludes that Social-
democratic parties are now best served by pursuing policies that beneﬁt insiders
while ignoring the interests of outsiders (Rueda, 2005, p. 61-62). Given that
insiders are a majority of the work force and that outsiders are politically largely
unengaged, social-democratic parties will have little choice but to defend their
interests. Moreover, Rueda (2005) adds, conservative parties, by supposedly
serving the interests of the well-oﬀ and skilled workers, may actually be more
willing to tackle the insider-outsider divide than left-wing governments.
The mechanism by which the insider / outsider divide translate into vot-
ing preferences and party strategies has been strongly contested in the litera-
ture. Most importantly Emmenegger (2009) challenges Rueda's theory and the
economist view on both theoretical and empirical grounds.
The ﬁrst theoretical critique is regarding the stark rationality assumptions of
the insider-outsider theory. He argues that many outsiders (as well as insiders)
might not be aware of the complex dynamics of labour market equilibriums, the
reasons for their underemployment or have a clear understanding of the eﬀects
of regulations on their respective utility. Even Saint-Paul (1993), perhaps the
most prominent representative of the economist view recognizes that due to a
lack of knowledge about the `actual' working of the labour market, voters can
be manipulated by rent-seeking groups to antagonize labour market reforms,
although they would beneﬁt from them (Emmenegger, 2009, p. 134). There
is no empirical support, he argues, to the argument that outsiders are in fact
aware of their condition of outsiders and that they actually associate stringent
labour market regulation with a barrier to entry to stable employment. In fact,
he argues, such hypothesis is not even considered by those responsible of writing
the Eurobaromether questionnaire:
The following question was included in the Eurobaromether (1996):
`What do you think should be the ﬁrst priority for combating un-
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employment? Shoud we. . . ?' The respondents could choose among
eleven suggested answers. The answer `reducing job security regula-
tions' was not even included. The authors of the questionnaire did
not seem to consider it to be of particular importance. How can this
issue then be expected to dominate voting decision? (Emmenegger,
2009, p. 134)
Secondly, and building on the previous assumption, Emmenegger (2009) ar-
gues that there is no reason to believe that insiders and outsiders will have
diﬀerent preferences as regards to job security or employment protection leg-
islation. In fact, he argues, outsiders might have a strong preference for job
security because they expect to be able to enjoy it in the future. In other words,
outsiders might behave against their short-term interest in the hope that they
will become insiders in the future.
The third critique directly addresses voting behaviour. Emmenegger (2009)
argues that a single policy issue does not determine voting preferences. In fact,
voters in elections have to choose among diﬀerent policy packages which surely
include issues they might disagree with, but the menu of party options they can
choose to vote is limited. As a result, it might be the case that even if outsiders
don't like high EPL they choose to vote for social democratic parties because,
for instance, they defend stronger unemployment beneﬁts. Finally, Emmeneg-
ger (2009) supports these claims by showing empirical evidence (using limited
survey data) that outsider workers can be expected to be equally supportive of
job security regulations and social-democratic parties as labour market insiders.
Other authors, such as Marx and Picot (2013) for the case of Germany ﬁnd,
on the contrary, that compared with standard employees, atypical workers have
stronger preferences for small left-wing parties. They also ﬁnd diﬀerences in vot-
ing behaviour compared to the unemployed: as atypical workers in Gemany do
not participate in elections less than insiders do (Marx and Picot, 2013, p. 165).
Unfortunately, the work of Marc and Picot only applies to one country.
Another element that might be aﬀecting the voting behaviour of outsiders is
household composition. Häusermann et al. (2016) ﬁnd, with data for Western
Europe, that women's social policy preferences are associated with their part-
ner's labour market situation. That is, women (presumably in a vulnerable work
situation) sharing a household with a male worker that holds a secure job, are
likely to have similar policy preferences as their partner. This might be, accord-
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ing to the authors, part reason that explains the apparently irrational political
behaviour of outsiders.
Häusermann (2012) ﬁnd yet another reason that might be behind the appar-
ently puzzling voting preferences of outsiders. By looking at the socio-political
situation of outsiders after welfare transfers across welfare regimes, they ﬁnd
that in some cases the disadvantages that atypical workers encounter in the
labour market are de facto corrected by public intervention. Importantly, they
argue, looking at outcomes in terms of welfare rights, political integration or
labour market power, is crucial to understand the actual political relevance of
the insider-outsider divide. In diﬀerent words, if outsiders do not suﬀer from
concrete disadvantages, why would they show a diﬀerent political behaviour than
insiders?
Considerations by sociologists and political scientists on the voting behaviour
of outsiders are relevant for the purposes of this paper. While the impact of the
rise in atypical employment on party politics remains contested in the literature,
one element seems clear. While insiders are eﬀectively defending their interests
through unions and do seem to vote coherently with their economic interests,
outsiders cannot be assumed to be defending their interests in an organized or
systematic way. Whether this is a consequence of their expectation to become
insiders one day, a result of bounded rationality, household composition or the
eﬀect of welfare transfers remains an open question. In all cases, there is one
important implication: a core assumption of the classic economist view on the
insider-outsider divide (ie the expectation that outsiders will organize to defend
their interests) does not seem to hold empirically. And this, somewhat para-
doxically, helps explaining why the insider-outsider divides are actually still so
persistent.
2.6 What triggers a reform to reduce duality?
The arguments explored in the previous section address the reasons why duality
might be so persistent over time. But what are the drivers of change? According
to Saint-Paul (2000), the duality equilibrium is instable and naturally leads to
a change in the balance of power between insiders and outsiders that results in
reform. As time passes, the stock of rigid, permanent contracts gradually erodes.
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After some time, t∗, those who hold rigid contracts will no longer be a majority
in the labour force, at which point the coalition of unemployed and temporary
workers (the outsiders) will have gained suﬃcient weight to politically support
reforms toward lower ﬂexibility.
This theory has been supported by evidence on the Spanish case. After the
Spanish transition to democracy in the 70s, labour markets became more rigid
as a result of the legalization of trade unions that had been persecuted for years.
However, after the oil shocks a deep recession followed at the beginning of the
80s and the unemployment rate went up to 22%. Saint-Paul (1993) argues that
while labour unions were in principle opposed to temporary contracts, the in-
siders started feeling threatened by unemployment, and the political conditions
became more prone to reform. The introduction of ﬂexible contracts by the
socialist Government in 1984 was expected to lead to a large eﬀect on the hiring
rate. The result, however, was mixed. The recovery led to increasing employ-
ment, but also to a deep division between a world of protected insiders shielded
from the economic cycle, and a new large group of precarious unprotected out-
siders. That division is still the norm today.
When the reforms were introduced, unions were already aware of the political
implications for them of opening-up the possibility of a segmented, dual labour
market to arise in the economy. As Saint-Paul explains, unions knew that
these contracts would gradually undermine their support. Flexible workers had
clearly diﬀerent interests. With the years, when the coalition of unemployed
and ﬂexible workers became stronger, the government started pressuring the
unions (Saint-Paul, 1993, p. 176) to introduce reforms to reduce the protection
gap between insiders and outsiders.
Similarly, Juan J. Dolado and Jimeno (2002) argue that after the spectac-
ular rise of temporary workers that followed the two-tier labour market reform
of 1984, pressures reform increased, leading to the labour market reforms that
reduced EPL for permanent workers in 1994 and 1997. According to their cal-
culations, in the mid-90s, the sum of the unemployed and temporary workers
outnumbered the insiders. The absence of any major labour market reform
reducing the protection of insiders over the boom years (1997-2007) when un-
employment fell to historical lows and the ratio between insiders and outsiders
well below 50% - would also sustain Sain-Paul's central hypothesis.
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However, the rule of thumb of the 50% ratio does not always apply. Bento-
lila et al. (2012a), referring in this case to Spain during the Great Recession, do
not ﬁnd this indicator useful, given that a signiﬁcant reform took place in 2010,
while the total number of unemployed and temporary workers was still below
50% (42%). Instead, they focus on the exposure of insiders to the risk of job loss,
another theoretical insight proposed by Saint-Paul (2000). They conclude that
given that the unemployment toll of the crisis was overwhelmingly assumed by
temporary workers - permanent employment did not fall below pre-crisis levels
until the ﬁrst quarter of 2011  insiders might have not perceived their jobs to
be threatened until well into the crisis.
Overall, the variation of the ratio between outsiders and insiders in the econ-
omy seems to be a variable that facilitates reforms in the labour market. How-
ever, given the problems with the theory analysed in previous sections, it remains
unclear how the causal mechanism for these reforms actually works. In other
words, while it might be relatively easy to generate a consensus for reform when
unemployment levels are abnormally high and growing, it is far from obvious
that reforms will eﬀectively reduce the insider-outsider divide. In fact, in a num-
ber of cases, even in times of deep crisis, reforms have focused on the ﬂexible
tier of the labour market, thus increasing the wedge between insiders and out-
siders (although this was not the case during the Great Recession, as analysed
in Section 2.2).
Following with Saint-Pauls' argument, the insider-outsider ratio normally
evolves with the economic cycle, and as we have seen, a simple look at the styl-
ized facts of reforms in Europe points to the idea that economic recessions play
a crucial role in driving reform activity. Usually these crisis are associated with
a tightening of external constraints, higher interest rates, rising external debt or
sudden stops in ﬁnancing.
Referring to the Great Recession Bentolila et al. (2012a) argue that labour
reform was triggered by external pressure coming from international ﬁnancial
markets, although the kind of reform that was undertaken did not signiﬁcantly
reduce the insider-outsider divide in the Spanish labour market (Bentolila et al.,
2012a, p. 20). A similar argument was proposed by Guillermo de la Dehesa
(Williamson, 1994, p. 137) also referring to the Spanish case (although, in this
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case, to a crisis 20 years before): only when the level of reserves was suﬃciently
low and the current account was in large deﬁcit have necessary economic ad-
justment and structural reform measures been taken. Bertola (2010) also ﬁnds
empirical evidence that countries with high public debt are likely to undertake
more reform.
However, when looking at the EMU, speciﬁc international political economy
dynamics that resulted from entering the Euro seem to have played a role well
beyond crisis related considerations. As we have seen in Section 2.4, four pe-
riods of reforms have been identiﬁed in EMU. Over the decade that preceded
the entrance in the Euro pressures to meet the core EMU convergence crite-
ria pushed countries to increase reform activity (see for instance Hancké and
Rhodes (2005)). The complement to the previous argument is the one proposed
by Fernandez-Villaverde et al. (2013) and Roldán (2013) for EMU. The ﬂow of
cheap credit that followed the introduction of the Euro reduced the pressures for
reform in peripheral countries (i.e. lower external pressures after meeting the
core EMU convergence criteria to access the Euro) whereby reforms were aban-
doned, institutions deteriorated, the response to the credit bubble was delayed,
and the growth prospects of these countries declined (Fernandez-Villaverde et
al., 2013, p. 146). Roldán (2013) ﬁnds some preliminary evidence for the EMU
to support that argument. Countries that received a larger ﬁnancial windfall
after the entrance in the Euro implemented less structural reforms. Duval and
Elmeskov (2006) anticipated also provided some early empirical evidence that
EMU could be leading to less reform pressure. Other papers have explored
the impact of ﬁnancial windfalls beyond the EMU experience. Looser credit
conditions have been linked to a general relaxation of constraints, lower reform
capacity and, ultimately poor growth performance (Vamvakidis, 2007).
Importantly, for the purposes of this paper, reform pressure coming from
EMU has also been associated to labour market reforms openly intended to
reduce duality. For the Italian case, referring to the Treu (1997) and Biagi
(2002) reforms, the OECD argues that:
To a greater or lesser extent, both these reforms were driven by
EU-related policy considerations. The drive to get Italy ready for
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) formed the background to
the Treu reform,(. . . ) The Biagi reform was based in part on the
European Employment Strategy and also involved changes dictated
by European law. (Tompson, 2009, p. 247)
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While in previous labour market reforms the dominant concern had been to
insure the protection of insiders, according to the OECD, the rise of a large
new class of precarious outsiders brought to a new political consensus (strongly
inﬂuenced by the EU) around the idea that further transformations in the labour
market needed to create greater opportunities for young workers, new entrants
and, generally, labour market outsiders (Tompson, 2009). Both the Treu (1997)
and Biagi (2002) reforms implemented measures to improve the protection of
temporary workers as well as diminishing some of the stringent regulations for
permanent workers.
In the literature that covers the Great Recession a number of papers explore
the diﬀerent reform paths followed by countries exposed to similar external con-
straints. For instance, Bentolila et al. (2012a) suggests that countries that signed
a Memorandum of Understanding with the troika and had to be bailed-out (such
as Greece or Portugal) followed a divergent path in relation to others. Given
that Spain only received a banking sector bailout, with limited conditionality on
the rest of the economy, this would explain why the two reforms carried out in
2010 and 2011 did very little to reduce duality. The author argues that, despite
the crisis, neither the government, nor the social partners were interested in
signiﬁcantly altering dual EPL. Adding to this argument, and analysing a larger
panel of countries, Saint-Paul (2000) does not ﬁnd a robust relationship between
the business cycle and the timing of labour market reforms, except for marginal
ones such as two-tier reforms that only aﬀect the ﬂexible tier of the market.
In a comparative study of labour market reforms between Italy and Spain
over the Great Recession, Picot and Tassinari (2014) point to another hypothe-
sis to explain the divergent reform paths between the two countries. They argue
that while both Italy and Spain shared severe labour market ineﬃciencies and
suﬀered from virtually the same external constraints over the Great Recession,
the labour reforms implemented by each country were fundamentally diﬀerent.
While Italy's reforms were much more encompassing (i.e. seriously and pur-
posely addressing duality, active labour market policies, unemployment beneﬁts
and EPL), Spain's 2012 reform was only liberalising (i.e. ﬁring costs for per-
manent employees were reduced, collective bargaining was decentralised), with
no intention of approaching a ﬂexicurity model.
Their core argument is that where the parties supporting government are
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not ideologically inclined towards broad-brush liberalisation and where imbal-
ances in social protection are widely recognised, as in Italy, a recalibration is
possible that aims at improving protection for non-standard workers and the un-
employed (Picot and Tassinari, 2014, p. 16). Given that Rajoy's conservative
government held an absolute majority and assuming that Renzi's government
was more left-leaning, ideological preferences are assumed to be explanations for
the diﬀerent reform paths followed in the labour market. Other authors, in the
political science ﬁeld, have highlighted the need for understanding the interac-
tion of external pressures with other domestic drivers such as electorally weak
governments and/or an intermediate level of union centralization Avdagic (2010).
According to the OECD, a number of other speciﬁc domestic political fac-
tors matter to drive duality-reducing reforms. Regarding the Italian case, the
transition to the second republic in the early 1990s brought several reform-prone
actors (economists, labour lawyers) to politics that had a shared understand-
ing of Italy's labour market problems. The Treu (1997) and the Biagi (2002)
reforms (both intended to reduce duality) involved long consultation processes,
including the preparation of a white paper for the Biagi reform, which was an
innovation in Italian policy making. Moreover, both reforms incorporated mea-
sures to compensate the losers of reform, such as subsidies to the Mezzogiorno2,
and legislative concessions on other issues, such as taxation and working time
(Tompson, 2009).
Speciﬁc domestic political factors also were crucial in driving the Spanish
reforms in the 90s. Spain adopted two reforms in 1994 and 1997 that aimed
at reducing duality by reducing incentives to use temporary contracts and by
lowering dismissal costs. Huge unemployment (25%), the persistent crisis and
the resulting strain on public ﬁnances facilitated a strong consensus on the need
for action on both reforms. The arrival of a new government in 1996 helped to
build momentum for reform and the lowering unemployment made changes in
EPL less threatening to workers. Shared objectives among the key protagonists
also mattered, given that the share of temporary employment had reached levels
seen nowhere else in the OECD, both trade unions and employers understood
that the status-quo was unsustainable. The ﬁnal result of the reform, however,
left the rights of those already employed under permanent contracts largely un-
aﬀected (Tompson, 2009).
2The term Mezzogiorno refers to the poorer regions in the South of Italy.
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The interaction between diﬀerent reforms can also be a factor driving re-
forms. Partial labour market reforms, such as two-tier reforms, tend to aﬀect
the political economy of future reforms. For instance, the introduction of ﬁxed-
term contracts in Spain in 1984 contributed to increasing ﬂexibility and reducing
employment protection. But by massively increasing duality  temporary con-
tracts became a third of all contracts  the reform created the conditions for
future reforms in the 1990s, which reduced the protection of permanent em-
ployment contracts (Juan J. Dolado and Jimeno, 2002). Similar evidence has
been found by Duval and Elmeskov (2006), referring to structural reforms in
the EMU: reforming one area, for instance, product markets, induces reforms in
other areas, for instance labour markets.
To conclude, there seems to be a number of factors that facilitate labour
market reforms. First, the eﬀect of recessions in increasing reform activity is
uncontested. Normally throughout economic crisis the share of outsiders in
the economy increases, presumably adding pressure for duality reducing reforms
to take place. However even in deep periods of crisis, there is no conclusive
evidence that reforms will reduce protection of insiders. A great number of
these crises (and the reforms that followed) are prompted by external constraints
such as sudden stops of ﬁnancing. However, the international political economy
dynamics that result from EMU - such as the EMU convergence criteria  matter
also to understand reforms. Nonetheless, while a combination of the explanatory
variables above might help to understand labour market reforms, the speciﬁc
drivers of duality reducing reforms remain still elusive in the literature.
2.6.1 Other lessons from the literature on the political
economy of structural reforms
This section explores the broader literature on the political economy of reform
with the aim of identifying other relevant factors that might be aﬀecting the
reform process. A large theoretical and empirical literature has been dedicated
to understanding the reasons why reforms are delayed as well as the drivers
of policy reform more generally. Key works in economics include Alesina and
Drazen (1991), who provide a model in which stabilizations are delayed because
it is rational for diﬀerent socioeconomic groups to try to shift the burden of sta-
bilization onto other groups, in a process that mimics a war of attrition game
and leads to the accumulation of debt. Other models, such as Tommasi and
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Velasco (1996), provide a framework for understanding ﬁscal proﬂigacy, where
ﬁscal policy is modelled as the outcome of a political process in which spending
is in the hands of several controllers who represent diﬀerent interest and behave
non-cooperatively.
These and other models are clearly relevant to understand the persistence of
ﬁscal proﬂigacy or the delay of stabilization, but to get a good understanding of
the drivers of reform (or lack of thereof) of dual labour market systems, speciﬁc
political economy dynamics seem to be more informative. In other words, there
is no reason to believe that the political coalitions, for instance, against ﬁscal
reforms are the same as those against two-tier systems. The literature on the
political economy of reform would probably beneﬁt from further specialization
on diﬀerent types of reforms (product markets, pensions, labour markets, etc.).
A similar argument applies to previous works trying to draw lessons from
a wide variety of reforms in diﬀerent sectors. For instance, Williamson (1994),
drawing from experiences from a large number of structural reforms (product,
ﬁnancial, ﬁscal, pensions, etc.) of developing countries derive a number of hy-
potheses about what makes reform feasible and successful. These include (1)
policy reforms emerge in response to crisis, (2) policy reforms are a right-wing
program (3) reformers enjoy a honeymoon period of support before opposition
builds up (4) reforms are more diﬃcult to sustain unless government is strong (5)
reforms are more likely if opposition is weak (6) strong leadership is important
(7) rapid implementation is important for successful reform (8) reformers should
make a good use of the media to build favorable coalitions and (9) reforms are
easier if losers are compensated. However, Williamson (1994) himself recognizes
that neither of these hypotheses is necessary or suﬃcient for successful reform.
Similarly to Williamson (1994), Tompson (2009)draws lessons from a number
of reforms in diﬀerent areas. While case studies might be more useful than, for
instance, broad econometric correlations to capture and understand the causal-
ity mechanisms that lead to diﬀerent reforms, further specialization is needed to
get better theoretical insights and a more useful guidance for policy-makers.
Tompson (2009) concludes that successful reforms are associated with (1) a
clear electoral mandate for reform; when reforms are crisis driven they may be
easier to pass in the ﬁrst place but diﬃcult to sustain over time; (2) eﬀective
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communication, through coordinated eﬀorts to persuade voters and stakeholders
of the need of reform, and in particular communicate the costs of non-reform.
The study also points out the need for policy design to be underpinned by solid
research and analysis, which, if (3) presented by an authoritative, non-partisan
institution that commands trust across the political spectrum, appears to have
a far greater impact. (4), they point out that reforms take time. As a rule
of thumb, the OECD considers that two years are needed to prepare the right
breeding ground for reform to succeed. (5) The strength and cohesiveness of a
government is also critical, if governments send mixed messages, opponents will
exploit them. (6) Strength of government matters more than the strength or
unity of opposition parties. (7) Government leadership is more important than
concentration or a broad agreement with social partners, unless the government
is in a position to reward social partners somehow. (8) The study also argues
that voters do not necessarily punish reforming governments. It remains a sub-
ject of future research to establish more systematically which of these potential
drivers of successful reform are more relevant for dual labour market reforms.
2.7 Main ﬁndings: a summary
In what follows I summarize the most important lessons from the literature
on the political economy of dual labour market reforms, trying to shed some
light on the reasons for the persistence of duality in Europe and the drivers of
duality-reducing labour market reforms:
Reasons for duality persistence and questions for further research
1. Almost by deﬁnition, the political inﬂuence of insiders in designing the
policy agenda outweighs that of the outsiders. Organizing political coali-
tions to defend the rights of those that already have a job is much easier
than defending those that could potentially have a job (or a more stable
one) if the regulation were to be changed.
2. The employed are (almost always) a majority and are usually better or-
ganized to defend their interests. Trade unions defend the interests of the
insiders. Typically, the workers represented in trade unions are unskilled,
highly protected employees, those most interested in keeping two-tier sys-
tems.
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3. Collective bargaining structures appear as the crucial mechanism through
which trade unions and insiders manage to impose their strategic interests
over those of the outsiders (not represented in those negotiations).
4. The most important unresolved question regarding the predictions of the
classic insider-outsider theory relates to outsider's voting behaviour: there
is no solid cross-country evidence that indicates that the political be-
haviour of outsiders is diﬀerent than that of the insiders. This is a possible
explanation for the strong persistence of dual labour markets: if outsiders
are not organizing to ﬁght duality, who will?
5. The insider-outsider divide has also changed party strategies: social-democratic
parties, which traditionally defended the interests of the most vulnerable,
tend to be best served now by defending the interests of the insiders.
6. However, the way the insider-outsider and party strategies divide are going
to be aﬀected by the emergence of new political parties across Europe is
still an question that remains broadly unaddressed.
Drivers of duality-reducing reforms and questions for further research
1. The duality equilibrium is instable, and its own dynamics lead to a change
in the balance of power between insiders and outsiders over time, as the
stock of rigid contracts gradually erodes, that may lead to reform.
2. Economic recessions and crisis are the main drivers of reform activity, but
there is no conclusive evidence that reforms in these periods actually go
in the direction of reducing duality.
3. The EMU has its own speciﬁc reform dynamics. Meeting EMU conver-
gence criteria forced countries to introduce labour market ﬂexibility. More-
over, the rhythm of reforms relaxed in the years that preceded the Great
Recession, and it increased, abruptly, throughout the crisis. The relation-
ship between the economic cycle and reforms deserves further exploration.
4. Stronger external surveillance in EMU seems also associated with duality
reducing reforms. The data on labour market reforms analysed in this
paper shows that the wedge between insiders and outsiders was reduced
since the onset of the ﬁnancial crisis.
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5. Case studies on successful reforms in Italy and Spain show that duality-
reducing labour market reforms are more likely under the following do-
mestic circumstances: an employment crisis, strong government leader-
ship, shared objectives among the protagonists respect for acquired rights,
eﬀective consultation and communication process, and compensation of
losers of the reform.
2.8 Concluding remarks
The objective of this paper was to try to understand why, despite the well-known
negative eﬀects of duality, dual labour markets are still so persistent in Europe.
In order to address this puzzle I have reviewed the available data on labour
market reforms and both the economics and political science literatures on the
political economy of reform of labour markets. The main ﬁndings of this review
can be divided in two parts.
In the ﬁrst sections I provide an overview of the relevant institutions, both
formal and informal, that matter to understand labour markets as well as a
description of the reform activity of European countries over the last 30 years.
When looking at the labour market institutions that matter to understand the
persistence of duality, collective bargaining structures have emerged as a crucial,
often overlooked, factor, to explain why the power of insiders remains so inﬂuen-
tial today, despite trade unions having lost a signiﬁcant amount of social support.
In terms of reforms, I identify four periods of reform intensity in EMU. Over
the decade that preceded the Euro, the EMU convergence criteria provided
a strong incentive for reforms. However, after entering the monetary union,
countries the relaxation of credit constraints made it easier for countries to get
indebted, so necessary reform was avoided. The third period starts with the
Great Recession: the data shows an unprecedented increase in reform activity.
According to the LABREF database, in this period the employment protection
of insiders decreased, while the protection of outsiders increased, meaning that
the EMU crisis contributed to reduce duality. Finally, the recovery seems to be
associated again with a sharp decrease in reform activity.
Overall the ﬁrst part of this paper adds two relevant contributions. First,
I provide a clear identiﬁcation of the economic cycle as a key driver of reforms
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in EMU, both in periods of bonanza and crisis. While the correlation between
crisis and reforms is very present in the literature, I have found that there is lit-
tle evidence available explaining the relationship between expansionary periods
and reforms. This is relevant, given that, for policy purposes, ﬁnding ways to
improve reform performance in the good part of the cycle would contribute to
reduce economic instability and social suﬀering.
Second, I point to the importance of some speciﬁc political economy dynam-
ics associated with EMU (such as the convergence criteria, or EMU surveillance
during the Great Recession) that have proven to be key in driving reforms. This
is particularly relevant when looking at dual labour market systems: while there
is no conclusive evidence in the literature that crisis lead to duality reducing
reforms, this paper ﬁnds that the interaction between economic hardship and
EMU surveillance seems to be more eﬀective at reducing the insider-outsider
divide.
In the second part of the paper I explore the politics of the insider-outsider
divide to try to understand the persistence of duality. Besides the, already
mentioned, importance of collective bargaining structures in explaining the per-
sistence of duality, I identify some gaps in the literature that deserve further
exploration. First, I ﬁnd one central problem in the classic labour market the-
ory of the insider-outsider divide (the economist view): empirical evidence does
not support the assumption that outsiders behave systematically diﬀerently, po-
litically, than insiders. If this is true, and outsiders' political preferences do not
diverge from those of insiders, for the purposes of this paper, it would be absurd
to expect them to be actively defending reforms to reduce duality, thus becom-
ing also agents of the status quo. While some authors have already pointed to
this problem, more research is needed to explore how bounded rationality might
play a key role here. Even when looking at newspapers, one becomes immedi-
ately aware of the limited understanding (even among economic journalists!) of
how the basic functioning of the labour market works. Expecting outsiders to
understand the tremendous complexities of labour market regulations and their
impact on their job situation is probably, simply, to ambitious.
Secondly, I ﬁnd very little evidence exploring the complex relationship be-
tween the insider-outsider divide and party strategies. While in the past the
association between insiders and social-democratic parties seemed to hold well,
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the appearance of a great number of new political parties in Europe might have
changed this relationship. Moreover, changes in the supply side of the equation
might lead to changes, as well, in the demand side. In other words, perhaps
the increasing number of party options might contribute to oﬀer new ways of
political engagement to outsiders that would deserve further research.
On a more methodological note, more work needs to be done to integrate
the increasing amount of evidence of diﬀerent case studies into a new theoretical
models of the political economy of labour market reforms that would, in turn,
help to improve the rigor of case-study analysis.
One lesson learned from this paper is that in order to understand the causes
of policy reform, inductive approaches on speciﬁc case studies might be as useful
a method as cross-country comparison, and probably more useful than compar-
ative econometric work based on broad macro correlations. A second lesson is
that the literature hugely beneﬁts from interdisciplinary work. A third lesson is
that it would be probably more useful for policy makers to study the political
economy of reforms separately, by ﬁeld. The political economy dynamics of dual
labour market reforms have little in common with reforms in other areas such
as pensions or product markets. So far the existing literature on the political
economy of reform, to my knowledge, has not done that eﬀort.
Finally, it needs to be noted that the reforms that are studied are always the
reforms that actually took place. The true political economy challenge probably
resides in the previous phase, where many reforms die for reasons that are never
studied.
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Conclusion
This thesis on the political economy of reforms in Europe explores two related
questions. The ﬁrst refers to the persistence of bad institutions, which remains
one central question both for academics and policy-makers in Europe today. The
second refers to the interaction between credit booms and the quality of insti-
tutions, which has gained a lot of attention as a result of the Great Recession
in Europe.
In the ﬁrst chapter I study the eﬀects of the boom of cheap credit, which
followed the introduction of the Euro, on reforms and corruption in the EMU.
I ﬁnd that countries that received a larger windfall of credit reformed less and
showed a larger increase in corruption. I also ﬁnd that those countries with
stronger initial institutions, at the beginning of the boom, managed to alleviate
the negative institutional dynamics associated with credit booms.
These dynamics manifest themselves in two diﬀerent ways. First, booms
create a general relaxation of constraints in the economy because they alter the
signalling that voters and governments receive from it. When the economy is
growing and creating jobs, incentives for reform weaken. The second is related
to the literature on the so-called resource curse and, to the best of my knowl-
edge, new in its application to credit booms: ﬁnancial windfalls (like a large
oil discovery) in interaction with poor institutions may act as a catalyser for
rent-seeking behaviour and corruption.
The results of my ﬁrst chapter are preliminary and, both the empirical ev-
idence and the causal mechanisms suggested here, should be further tested.
Nonetheless, the results resonate with the existing evidence that periods of eco-
nomic bonanza might be detrimental for reforms, and also provide an origi-
nal hypothesis on the interaction between credit booms and institutions, which
might open avenues for further research on the political economy of corruption.
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The second chapter is a survey of the literature on the political economy
of reform of dual labour market institutions. The abuse of temporality and
youth precariousness are today central concerns for a number of European gov-
ernments. Both are a direct consequence of two-tier labour market systems.
The key question addressed in this paper is why duality is so persistent in Eu-
rope, given the overwhelming consensus on the negative eﬀects of duality in the
economy. The main contribution of the paper is that it is the ﬁrst attempt to
provide a comprehensive survey of the speciﬁc literature on the reasons for the
persistence and the drivers of reform in dual labour markets, which I hope to
be useful for both further research and policy guidance.
I draw a number of lessons. First, more research is needed to understand why
temporary workers and the unemployed have not found better ways to defend
their interests in the labour markets. Second, I point to collective bargaining
structures as a key, often overlooked element, crucially contributing to the per-
sistence of the insider-outsider divide. Third I ﬁnd that research on the political
economy of reform would beneﬁt from more specialization in order to ﬁnd more
systematic theories that help understand the drivers of diﬀerent reforms in dif-
ferent ﬁelds. Given that there is little connection between the drivers of, for
instance, pension reform and reform of dual labour markets, studying them sep-
arately would likely lead to more useful policy insights. More speciﬁc case studies
and comparative work are needed to help inform and build a more comprehen-
sive theory on the political economy of reform of dual labour markets in Europe.
Overall, this thesis oﬀers a broad picture of how reforms have developed
in Europe over the last 30 years. What this picture shows is that the credit
cycle plays a more important role than what was previously thought. On the
one hand, the view that external constraints are key drivers of reform seems
reinforced by the available evidence in EMU. Remarkably, more reforms were
done in Southern European economies in the three years that followed the be-
ginning of the Great Recession than in the whole previous decade. Contrary to
the conventional wisdom held 20 years ago on the EMU eﬀects on reforms, the
monetary straightjacket of EMU did not lead to an increase in reform activity.
In fact, over the years that preceded the Great Recession, those countries that
needed more reform to catch up with international competitive pressures, were
the ones that reformed less.
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This has one straightforward lesson for the future. The EMU needs to be
better equipped to deal with reforms in periods of bonanza. This is particularly
relevant given the social suﬀering (and its political consequences) that resulted
from the Great Recession. If countries implement harsh reforms, but they have
ﬁscal space to compensate losers, social suﬀering will be diminished. Looking
at the most recent reform developments, the picture does not look very bright
either. With the return of growth and credit  particularly since the decisive
intervention of the ECB to guarantee lending - many necessary reforms have
been postponed. In Spain, for instance, there has not been a single ambitious
structural reform since 2012, and key structural reforms such as pensions, the
judiciary, active labour market policies, employment protection or education re-
main unaddressed.
Given that debt levels are still at record historical levels and that growth
enhancing reforms are not being implemented, the next crisis is likely to be very
diﬃcult to handle. Moreover, in the coming years, new factors (that were not
present in the ﬁrst two decades of the EMU) will need to be taken into account for
the political economy of reforms. Notably, increasing political fragmentation in
national parliaments and the rise of populist and Eurosceptic forces all over the
continent will probably translate in increasing diﬃculties to carry out reforms.
Furthermore, in some cases, several the growth-enhancing reforms that had been
implemented in previous years are likely to be undone. We are already observing
this process in Italy and Spain.
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